



Governing Disassembly

Journal:	<i>Housing Studies</i>
Manuscript ID	CHOS-2020-0312.R1
Manuscript Type:	Original paper
Subject Area:	Housing management, Local housing policy, Social and public housing
Methods:	Case study, Social theory, Archival analysis
Geography:	Australia and New Zealand
Author-Supplied Keywords:	policy, maintenance, property management

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Governing Disassembly

ABSTRACT *Without proper attention, houses disassemble. In public housing, property management regimes are charged with performing the repairs and maintenance necessary to combat this entropic tendency. This article argues that such governance regimes can accelerate housing's disassembly, through rules that restrict housing interventions, bureaucratic technologies that misrecognize housing failure, and processes that defer and delay necessary fixwork. It analyzes Indigenous housing in the Northern Territory of Australia, in terms of three specific legal-bureaucratic instruments and the temporalizations they constitute: the lease and promise; the tender and repetition; the condition report and waiting. The article considers the effects of these pairings in Alice Springs town camps and the challenge of thinking beyond bureaucratic housing regimes.*

KEY WORDS: Housing, policy, maintenance, temporality, property management

Without proper attention, housing disassembles. While housing breakdown is inevitable, its trajectory is hardly predictable. A pipe bursts, a toilet blocks, windows crack, an oven breaks, taps calcify, mold grows, formaldehyde exhales, rats chew, termites burrow, and any originary failure can manifest a series of distributed effects requiring intervention. To build a house is to seal the fate of perennial repairs and maintenance.

The form that housing remediation takes typically depends on legal tenure – the historical ossification of rights and obligations to repair broken things. Owner-occupiers with liquid capital employ a local tradesperson, or head to the hardware store and then perform some

1
2
3 DIY. Tenants in private rentals debate whether to contact their landlord, weighing the
4
5 complaint against the threat of increased rent or eviction. Similarly, public housing tenants
6
7 might submit a request to the property manager responsible for maintaining their
8
9 accommodation to legal minimum standards. In all cases, residents are vulnerable to the skill
10
11 and depth of fixwork, the efficacy of guidelines and regulatory oversight, and the perpetual
12
13 but sporadic deconstruction of domestic environments.
14
15

16
17
18 This article is focused on public housing tenancies in the Northern Territory (NT) of
19
20 Australia. It provides a concrete analysis of particular legal-bureaucratic instruments
21
22 operating in a specific context: the Alice Springs town camps. Following Valverde (2015, p.
23
24 2), the language of 'concrete analysis' rather than case study aims to avoid any implication
25
26 that the description exemplifies general theoretical concepts or homogenous, coherent,
27
28 higher-level policy intentions. This is important because governance arrangements in Alice
29
30 Springs town camps are different to those at other NT town camps, and from arrangements at
31
32 other remote communities, in urban public tenancies, or on Indigenous homelands, let alone
33
34 other Australian state and territory jurisdictions. Generic policy instruments appear across
35
36 multiple contexts and are implemented according to common social and political goals.
37
38 However, the critical tendency to scale analyses to system-level explanatory forces such as
39
40 neoliberalism, late capitalism, settler-colonialism, and post-industrialism, while politically
41
42 useful, rarely illuminates how governance practically unfurls in particular places. Holding
43
44 such diagnoses at bay is significant not simply as a matter of accurate description, but on
45
46 behalf of understanding the networks into which alternative programs – reformist or radical –
47
48 might effectively intervene.
49
50
51
52
53
54

1
2
3 This article argues that governance regimes are central to the poor condition of much state
4 supplied Indigenous housing. In doing so, it models an argument for detailed attention to *how*
5 technologies of governance accelerate housing breakdown. It responds to academic analyses
6 that provide summations of the poor state of Indigenous housing in order to offer
7 recommendations for new principles, guidelines, surveys, working groups, funding, and so on
8 – as though the introduction of those reforms will be either easily won or actionable without
9 compromise or novel ill-effects. This is not a rejection of the optimism inherent in proposals
10 for more just or effective policies, or even, as Lea (2012, p. 120) aptly diagnoses, an
11 argument about the ‘remedial circularity’ of self-sustaining government bureaucracy and
12 academic critique. I argue that any such proposal must begin with a thorough understanding
13 of the techniques of existing regimes and how these might be reformed, redeployed, or set
14 aside in any newly proposed configuration. Call it staying with the trouble (Haraway, 2016),
15 staying with the state (Lea, 2021), or wading through the banal detail of everyday
16 governance. This requires attending to how the present is underpinned by conflicting legacies
17 that orient and constrain the potential impact of contemporary policy and activism alike.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 Through close analysis of the 2016 NT Public Accounts Committee *Inquiry into Housing*
41 *Repairs and Maintenance on Town Camps*, this article considers how housing’s disassembly
42 is occasionally delayed, but more often accelerated and exacerbated by governance regimes.
43 Attention to the detail of how property and tenancy management systems oversee the
44 disassembly of housing focuses here on three specific legal-bureaucratic instruments and the
45 temporalizations they constitute for houses and their tenants at Alice Springs town camps.
46 These are the lease and promise; the tender and repetition; and the condition report and
47 waiting. The description that follows shows how such techniques of attention and
48 intervention can contribute to housing’s entropy, suggesting pause for analyses that, by
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 exposing government negligence, conclude a need for greater oversight. The conclusion
4 nevertheless reflects on the utility, if not inevitability, of those instruments for effective
5
6 housing governance.
7
8

9 10 Disassembly 11 12

13
14
15 In the United States, disinvestment from necessary repairs and maintenance accelerated the
16 dilapidation of public housing towers in a process of active neglect or '*de facto* demolition'
17 (Arrigoitia, 2014, p. 173). This process legitimated calls to condemn public housing and the
18 transition to a system of state subsidized vouchers for the private rental market
19 (Seicshnaydre, 2016). Much analysis of such phenomena situates their progress within
20 governments' increasingly neoliberal welfare policies, hastened by corporate lobbying for
21 profitable development (Goetz, 2013). In contrast, Indigenous housing in the Northern
22 Territory (NT) has in recent years shifted to a mostly public system. This system has been
23 subject to significant Commonwealth and NT government expenditure on residential
24 construction, under the 'Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program' (SIHIP),
25 the *National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing* (NPARIH), and the
26 ongoing 'Our Community. Our Future. Our Homes.' (OCOFOH) programs.
27
28

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49 2007 was a pivotal year for this intensification of state involvement in Indigenous housing in
50 the NT, including the assumption of obligations as landlord that play out in Alice Springs
51 across the following decade. Housing in regional and remote communities that was
52 previously managed by Indigenous Community Housing Organizations (ICHOs) became the
53 object of Commonwealth, and quickly NT, governance via the Northern Territory National
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Emergency Response ('The Intervention'), and according to the broad goal of 'normalising' social service provision. Under the guise of concern for child sexual abuse, the Commonwealth government exempted Intervention measures from the protections of the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* and without consultation passed a tranche of major reforms in NT Indigenous communities (Altman, 2013). The breadth and ongoing impact of the Intervention constitutes it as a critical event, in Das's (1997) terms, as one that involves the annihilation and recreation of worlds, including Indigenous people's control over their housing. While the programs and agreements listed above have increased housing stock and marginally reduced crowding, a significant proportion of town camp and remote community housing remains in poor condition and requires refurbishment or replacement (DHCD, 2017; Commonwealth, 2017).

This article does not assess the relative outcomes for housing under community versus government management. Instead, it considers one of the key recommendations of the Commonwealth's (2017, p. 2) NPARIH review – 'an increased emphasis on planned cyclic maintenance' to maintain existing housing stock – against one of the NPARIH's original goals: to 'Implement robust and standardized Property and Tenancy Management (PTM) of all remote Indigenous housing' (COAG, 2008). That is, it places the recent recommendation alongside the near-identical commitment from a decade prior. These are not juxtaposed to simply criticize government failure, but to highlight the distance between high-level policy commitments (who but the most polemical commentator would argue against the need for cyclical maintenance of public assets?) and everyday governance. Graham and Thrift (2007, p. 5) suggest we might understand 'breakdown and failure as the means by which societies learn and learn to re-produce', however there is nothing inevitable to such lessons. In political announcements and policy design settings, property and tenancy management are often

1
2
3 subordinated to capital works, despite planned maintenance being long understood as
4 necessary for sustainable Indigenous housing (Pholeros *et al.*, 1993). However, even as
5 repairs and maintenance are increasingly proclaimed within policy frameworks and budgets,
6 the disassembly of Indigenous public housing continues to be underpinned by the legal-
7 bureaucratic instruments engendered by those governing regimes.
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17 By disassembly, I mean the dilapidation, deterioration, decay, and breakdown that the
18 housing assemblage experiences from the point of construction. Such changes in form convey
19 the nature of housing as a *permeable membrane* that both shelters and sustains its inhabitants
20 while subjecting them to the dynamic effects of building materials and the surrounding
21 environment (Murphy, 2006; Shapiro, 2014). To paraphrase Braun and Whatmore (2010),
22 this is the *stuff* of housing politics that exposes housing as always 'housing-in-action' (Jacobs
23 *et al.*, 2011, p. 83). While housing metamorphoses are technically complex, unpredictable,
24 multi-directional, and variously sensible, inevitable processes of disassembly can be deferred
25 by effective property management. Paying adequate attention to *how* this form of quotidian
26 governance unfolds, this article eschews extended engagement with a vast literature offering
27 diagnoses for spatial zones of sacrifice, exploitation, and abandonment, and therefore relevant
28 to the protracted radical contingency of certain Indigenous housing contexts in central
29 Australia (Povinelli, 2011; Lerner, 2012). Spatial constraints also limit a thorough review of
30 an expanding literature on infrastructural time, including analyses of developmental and
31 extractive temporalities (Appel, 2018), and of the anticipatory character of infrastructural
32 projects (Cross, 2015) – though such work informs the following discussion.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Instead, I turn to Vigh's description of crisis and chronicity to help frame the recent history of Northern Territory town camp housing. For many people, Vigh (2008, p. 6) argues, 'crisis is

1
2
3 endemic rather than episodic and cannot be delineated as an aberrant moment of chaos or a
4 period of decisive change'. As such, the 'temporal persistence of [...] dysfunction' (Estroff in
5 Vigh, 2008, p. 10) forces people 'to make lives in fragmented and volatile worlds rather than
6 waiting for normalization and reconfiguration' (p. 8), attuning to and navigating disorder.
7
8

9
10 Applying this framing, we can see there is not simply a housing crisis in the NT; rather, the
11 instability, unpredictability, and continuity of housing insecurity is the long-term context
12 from which people (residents and property managers alike) interpret and act in the world.
13
14 This bears on determinations of acceptable standards, necessary oversight, timeliness, and
15 how dilapidated or cruddy something might become before housing's entropy is attended to.
16
17

18 While property and tenancy regimes instantiate an interventionist and stabilizing logic –
19 maintain assets and encourage resident sedentization – they have in fact contributed to this
20 perennial crisis-as-context. Such regimes have the potential to displace residents, not by
21 shifting them spatially (though they sometimes do), but by '[leaving] communities in a place
22 stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable' (Nixon, 2011, p. 19). Such
23 characteristics include community control over housing and the self-determination this
24 affords First Nations people even where property management presents a practical challenge.
25
26

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Narrowing from such useful abstractions as abandonment, slow violence, and ongoing crisis,
property and tenancy management involves legal-bureaucratic instruments which undermine
effective intervention through various obstructions, deferrals, delays, disincentives,
accelerations, and intensities. Policies enable generic instruments to unfurl in specific and
sometimes unruly ways (Lea, 2020), constituting particular temporalizations: that is,
organizing and ordering time according to the demands made of the subjects they govern.
Following Bear (2016, p. 492), this is 'time as technique' (or *techne*) in housing governance,
where 'technologies of imagination ... are acts of creative, skillful making that intervene in

1
2
3 our experiences of the passage of time and senses of agency'. Apart from the lease, the
4 tender, and the condition report, there are numerous bureaucratic technologies involved in
5 property management: titles, tenancy agreements, rental ledgers, work orders, employment
6 contracts, construction standards, and so on. Bureaucratic instruments manipulate time to
7 bring particular social worlds into being: setting temporal limits for contracts, programs, and
8 eligibility; establishing the patterns and rhythms of interventions and their requirements;
9 resurrecting biographies and precedents to adjudicate in the present; manifesting conditions
10 of temporal scarcity or abundance; and revising, delaying, and accelerating the velocity of
11 governance in general.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26 The myriad ways that time might be manipulated by bureaucratic instruments indicate the
27 variability of property and tenancy management regimes, even within a jurisdiction. In the
28 NT, housing quality is chiefly governed by the *Residential Tenancies Act 1999* (NT), which
29 sets (undefined) standards for security, habitability, and cleanliness (Grealy & Lea, 2020).
30
31 Maintaining housing stock to meet legislative standards, where a residential tenancy
32 agreement is in place, is the chief requirement of property management. Pholeros and Phibbs
33 (2012) argue that best practice housing maintenance approaches include: utilizing the
34
35 *National Indigenous Housing Guide*; prioritizing safety and health issues; employing
36 environmentally appropriate materials and techniques; consulting with local communities and
37 employing local labour; and implementing multiple inspections to ensure high standards. Yet
38 any such list belies the empirical tribulations of instituting guidelines, establishing oversight,
39 training personnel, and guaranteeing funding to protect hard-won gains. In the NT, particular
40 challenges include access to licensed contractors, the cost of remote procurement, limited
41 rental revenue, employment and training requirements, population increase and mobility, and
42 environmental factors. Bureaucrats, service providers, asset managers, and maintenance
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 officers face such challenges within systems underpinned by contradictory logics regarding
4 the rights and obligations of residents to housing. The failure of property management to
5 combat disassembly is thus not simply attributable to an absence of effort or the malintent of
6 professionals involved, even if, as Lea (2012) argues, the reproduction of Indigenous
7 communities as anarchic is necessary to justify the continuity of government intervention.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17 The following section provides a concrete analysis of governance within a specific context:
18 the Alice Springs town camps. It is divided into three sub-sections that each pair a particular
19 legal-bureaucratic instrument with a related figure of temporal subjection: the lease and
20 promise; the tender and repetition; and the condition report and waiting. The lease, the tender,
21 and the condition report are governmental instruments designed to specify obligations for
22 housing provision, designate responsibility for remediating shortcomings, and survey the
23 state of those assets. These are instruments for managing the disassembling tendency of
24 housing, but which the analysis shows can actually accelerate breakdown.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 **Things Fall Apart** 41 42 43

44 This analysis is based on the 2016 *Inquiry into Housing Repairs and Maintenance on Town*
45 *Camps* (hereafter Inquiry). The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is designed to scrutinize
46 government spending, and this Inquiry was driven by the NT government obligation to
47 review town camp infrastructure every three years, alongside 'growing concerns about the
48 condition of housing on town camps and repairs and maintenance not being completed within
49 a reasonable period of time' (PAC, 2016i, p. 11). The NT government had assumed
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 responsibility for some town camp housing following the Intervention, but had failed to meet
4
5 its review obligation for six years.
6
7
8
9

10 The PAC Inquiry sought:
11

12 To inquire into and report on the repairs and maintenance of housing on town camps in
13 the Northern Territory, with particular regard to:
14

15

- 16 (a) Timeliness of completing repairs
- 17 (b) Costs of repairs; and
- 18 (c) Consistency, accessibility and efficiency of administrative arrangements (PAC,
19
20 2016i, p. 10).

21 Among numerous evaluations of NT housing, the Inquiry is unusual for its sustained
22 objectification of the systems charged with managing and maintaining housing. At the time of
23 the Inquiry, subleasing arrangements meant that the NT Department of Housing (hereafter the
24 department) was administratively responsible for housing at 17 town camps at Alice Springs
25 (including 284 houses), contracting third-party providers for housing management services.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 Alice Springs is the largest town in Central Australia, situated about 1,500 kilometres from
41 the northern city of Darwin and South Australia's capital, Adelaide. Home to about 25,000
42 people, Alice Springs is a regional hub for surrounding remote communities and the town
43 camps on its immediate periphery. These camps emerged in the late-nineteenth century as
44 pastoralists displaced Indigenous people from their traditional country towards the town's
45 fringes. Aboriginal people were prohibited entry into Alice Springs from 1928 to 1964 unless
46 they possessed an employment permit, and town camps were destroyed at least four times
47 between 1929 and 1960 (Coughlan, 1991). Securing tenure to town camp lands surrounding
48 Alice Springs was a major political victory for Indigenous people, achieved through the serial
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 recognition of individual housing associations as leaseholders from the 1970s onwards.
4

5 Vivian (2010, p. 15) describes that
6

7 In contrast to the systematic cultural destruction imposed by church run missions and
8 government settlements, [at town camps] children were not placed in dormitories,
9
10 Aboriginal languages were not forbidden, cooking was not restricted to communal
11 dining rooms and life was not regimented.
12
13

14 The Inquiry thus provides an important picture of the effects of state intervention that was not
15 requested, and which in the name of securing state access to assets has undercut hard-won
16 rights of Indigenous people.
17
18

19 This analysis of repair and maintenance regimes is mediated by the Inquiry's materials. In
20 addition to the *Report on Repairs and Maintenance of Housing on Town Camps* (PAC,
21 2016i), this includes 11 written submissions, transcripts of two days of public hearings,
22 answers to written questions and questions taken on notice, and associated media releases.
23 Such documentary genres effect obvious exclusions and provide variously reliable accounts
24 of town camp governance. But taken together these texts indicate the administrative obstacles
25 to adequate housing outcomes. It is tempting to characterize this analysis as an ethnography
26 of documents (Hull, 2012), but while the specificity and embeddedness of documents within
27 housing management is considered in detail, the chief focus is with looking through the
28 contents of paperwork rather than at the material forms of documentation (Kafka, 2009). That
29 said, the conclusion considers the Inquiry's role in instigating the NT government to meet its
30 review obligation, and thus the capacity of bureaucracy to reproduce itself through reform.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

The Lease and Promise

At Alice Springs town camps, the conditions in which property management regimes were established were significantly structured by local leasing arrangements, which were subject to significant reform through the Intervention. Under section 31 of the *Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007* (Cth), the Commonwealth government compulsorily granted five year leases over 64 NT Aboriginal Communities. This was a radical departure from the governance of land and leasing under the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* (Cth) (*ALRA*) and the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth). Until the early 2000s, Indigenous housing and municipal infrastructure was typically funded and often constructed by governments without formal property arrangements (Terrill 2009). A shift from this approach preceded the Intervention, through the cessation of the Community Housing Infrastructure Program (CHIP) and Commonwealth funding of Indigenous Community Housing Organizations (ICHOs), as well as via the Commonwealth government amendment to the *ALRA* to allow for ‘township leasing’, whereby the land on which an Aboriginal community sits is leased to the Commonwealth, which can then sublease sections of that land (Terrill, 2009). This ‘secure tenure’ policy was consolidated by the Intervention in 2007, under the *Memorandum of Understanding on Indigenous Housing Accommodation and Related Services*, and in the 2008 *National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing* (NPARIH), in which parties agreed that the Commonwealth would have no further responsibility for the delivery of Indigenous housing and infrastructure. Exemplifying a broader trend toward welfare ‘conditionality’ at both the levels of behaviorally-proscribed tenants and contractually-restrained state and territory governments (Nethercote, 2015), Commonwealth funding for Indigenous housing and infrastructure was made contingent on securing access to Indigenous communities via leases. In effect, this has resulted in 40-year subleases over housing precincts in remote communities and town camps to the (now) NT Department of Local Government, Housing and Community Development. Within such

1
2
3 arrangements, the department assumes legal responsibility for housing, including property
4 management and tenancies.
5
6
7
8
9

10 The Inquiry sought to sift through the muddle that this leasing revolution generated. At Alice
11 Springs in 2009, Aboriginal Housing Associations representing 14 town camps entered into
12 tripartite Living Area Subleases with the Commonwealth authority, the Executive Director of
13 Township Leasing (EDTL), and the Chief Executive Officer of the (then) NT Department of
14 Housing. The EDTL established a Housing Management Agreement (HMA) with the NT
15 government which transfers responsibility for 'all areas located within the town camp
16 boundary and captures all infrastructure, including housing, open spaces roads, parks and
17 community centres' (PAC, 2016i, p. 24). By the Inquiry, this situation applied in 17 town
18 camps, with subleases established for a period of 40 years. Despite this temporal horizon, the
19 Inquiry heard that the HMA had expired in 2012, subsequently operating as a periodical
20 agreement on a month-to-month basis. EDTL annual reports noted that the HMA's month-to-
21 month status meant capital works had not been able to progress in town camps, while the
22 HMA stipulated that individual tenancy agreements could not extend beyond its conclusion.
23 Thus the inability of the Commonwealth and NT governments to secure ongoing agreements
24 meant that residents were subject to insecure tenancy arrangements in contexts where
25 infrastructure provision was also impeded.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 Tangentyere Council – an Aboriginal-controlled incorporated association that represents
50 Alice Springs town camp housing associations – has since its establishment in 1977 earned a
51 widely respected reputation as a community council and resource organization. Prior to the
52 Intervention, Tangentyere Council managed 199 houses across the town camps. Throughout
53 protracted negotiations during the Intervention period, Aboriginal Housing Associations
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 through Tangentyere Council resisted government pressure to sign a 99-year sublease to town
4 camp lands in exchange for 50 million dollars funding for housing and essential
5 infrastructure. The eventual 40-year sublease was agreed to following a commitment of 100
6 million dollars over five years. Lease negotiations included an eventual ultimatum put by the
7 Commonwealth that tenancies become the responsibility of the NT government or else the
8 Commonwealth would compulsorily acquire town camp land. Lawyers for Tangentyere
9 Council responded that, faced with compulsory acquisition, 'The loss of tenure to these lands
10 is something that is abhorrent to the housing associations and they could not run the risk that
11 it might occur' (in Graham, 2009). Although town camps subsequently received new houses,
12 refurbishments, and improvements to municipal infrastructure (PAC, 2016i), Tangentyere
13 Council conveyed that consent given under duress does not preclude refusal (see Simpson,
14 2016), stating that it

15 remains of the opinion that the essential housing and services should not have come at
16 the price of leasehold. Weighing up the extreme level of need of Town Camp residents,
17 with the threat by the Commonwealth Government to compulsorily acquire the camps
18 if they did not sign, the Housing Associations negotiated the best option available at the
19 time, and agreed to sign the subleases. (Tangentyere Council, 2020)

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45 The tying of housing and infrastructure funding to long-term leases forced the hand of many
46 communities into agreements like those thrust upon Tangentyere Council. Leasing under the
47 secure tenure policy required contract-making between radically unequal parties. Rental
48 revenues from Indigenous community housing are typically insufficient to cover house
49 insurance and repair and maintenance costs, underpinning a reliance on government subsidy
50 (Habibis *et al.*, 2019). The NT government is itself structurally dependent on Commonwealth
51 income via the redistribution of state and federal taxes. In this context, 40-year leases
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 represented a compromise from the original government demand for 99-year leases. But such
4 agreements were also established following Commonwealth impatience at ongoing
5 negotiations and the eventual threat of compulsory acquisition. That negotiations must
6 conclude was disputed by Tangentyere Council's lawyers, who responded to the
7 Commonwealth that 'It is simply incorrect to assert that time has run out. The timetable is
8 completely within your power to set, as indeed you have done throughout these negotiations'
9 (in Graham, 2009). Commonwealth control of both the clock and the purse strings in
10 negotiations was indicative of a wider phenomenon across this Intervention period wherein
11 the demand for secure tenure became conditional for government housing and infrastructure
12 funding, with the absence of leases exploited by governments to justify the delay of
13 infrastructural provision. This was a convenient application of the NPAIRH clause on
14 'normalised service arrangements', interpreted as concerning the standardization of leases
15 rather than of living standards. Since the Intervention it has also proved empirically untrue
16 that leases are required for government-funded housing: after a decade of delay, houses were
17 constructed at Borroloola town camps without leases in place, while only 16 of 73 remote
18 communities received new houses under SIHIP with the majority receiving housing
19 refurbishments.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31 In Alice Springs, as across the NT, the lease has operated as a demand and a promise. The
32 leaseholder exchanges relative political autonomy for the promise of housing and
33 infrastructure, and the formalization of ongoing obligations to manage and maintain those
34 assets. Protracted lease negotiations have themselves contributed to housing dilapidation, by
35 delaying the institution of legal arrangements, funding, and staffing for repair work. But this
36 period of negotiation is also the temporal window during which commitments to funding and
37

1
2
3 services can be extracted from governments and after which such opportunity dissipates
4
5 (Howey, 2020).
6
7
8
9

10 The emergency rhetoric and lawmaking underpinning the Intervention facilitated the
11 production of leases under new norms for conditional infrastructural provisioning: no lease,
12 no houses. This can be understood through Stoler's (2013, p. 8) description of imperial
13 formations as 'states of deferral', establishing 'gradated forms of sovereignty' and offering
14 promissory notes for future autonomy. However, the length of such sublease arrangements –
15 40 or 99 years – defers community autonomy in housing management into far-flung futures,
16 even as shorter-term subordinate arrangements such as HMAs expire and generate negative
17 implications for residents' tenancies and community infrastructure. The opening urgency of
18 agreement-making transitions into governmental inertia, as the long-term temporal horizons
19 of leases establish the continuity of unstable governance for town camps. For, as described
20 above, a 40-year sublease garnered only five years of funding, with subsequent investment
21 dependent on future negotiations. With this legal framework in place, the capacity (or
22 willingness) of the NT government to fund future housing programs is contingent on renewed
23 Commonwealth funding. This was evident at the twilight of the NPARIH in 2018, when
24 protracted delays over funding arrangements between the Commonwealth and NT
25 governments were resolved, (in the form of 500 million dollars of Commonwealth housing
26 funding over five years), in the same week the NT government lifted its moratorium on
27 exploration for hydraulic fracturing. As a particular legal instrument, the lease thus
28 establishes the temporal context in which the NT government is responsible for town camp
29 property and tenancy management, but where the available funding for meeting legislated
30 obligations is far from guaranteed.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 *The Tender and Repetition*
4
5
6
7

8 The Inquiry examined the period 2010 to 2016, following the establishment of subleases for
9 Alice Springs town camps in 2009. Across this period, the department subcontracted housing
10 management services through a public tendering process, while remaining responsible for
11 contract management, procurement, and service coordination. Because this model differed
12 from the NT government's urban public housing management, the subcontracting model was
13 justified through support for local employment. In order that it could remain involved in
14 housing management on town camps and at the government request for an independent
15 Indigenous-controlled community housing provider, Tangentyere Council, in collaboration
16 with the Central Land Council and Healthabitat, established the Central Australian
17 Affordable Housing Company (CAAHC) in 2009. Thus from 2010 to 2012, CAAHC held a
18 contract to provide both property and tenancy management services. In 2012, the department
19 split housing management services into property management (including repairs and
20 maintenance) and tenancy management services, awarding separate contracts. There was no
21 clear justification for this division, although Deputy CEO Mr Bamber told the Inquiry that
22 'One of the cons [of having a single housing manager] is you do not have that tension
23 between the tenancy inspections, looking at work being done by the housing maintenance
24 contractor' (PAC, 2016ii, p. 11). Alongside these major contracts, the department also
25 employed panel contractors to perform specialized labour, relating to plumbing and gas,
26 electrical, refrigeration, carpentry, and pest control work.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

The tender process is the formal solicitation by government to procure non-government contractors for work it is unable or unwilling to do directly. This form of contractualism has been expanded through the winnowing of public sector expertise (Fisher, 1997). Clause 11 of

1
2
3 the Alice Springs subleases established a formal requirement that the NT government 'must
4 call for tender for the provision of housing management services in the Subleased Alice
5 Springs Living Areas within 2 years and 6 months of the commencement of the first Alice
6 Springs Living Areas Sublease' (PAC, 2016i, p. 25). This requirement is easily framed as
7 neoliberal outsourcing. However, in this context it is not the dismantling of a centralized state
8 welfare bureaucracy, but rather a transformation from a prior form of ad hoc outsourcing to
9 Indigenous Community Housing Organisations (ICHOs) to a competitive tender process for
10 government service contracts in which the remaining ICHOs are forced to participate.
11
12

13 Abstractly, the tender promises the enactment of an ideal bureaucracy – emotionless,
14 impersonal, dehumanized (Weber, 1978). A job description is developed, standards and
15 metrics are set, and a reporting and audit structure is established. An objective department
16 then assesses prospective contractors according to their competitive advantage in what
17 department CEO Ms Clifford characterized as an 'open, transparent and public competitive
18 process' (PAC, 2016ii, p. 3).
19
20

21
22 In practice at the Alice Springs town camps, this tender model maintained decentralized
23 service provision while expanding government intervention in the minutiae of administration.
24 In particular, the division between property and tenancy management established complicated
25 procedures for reporting housing defects and having them repaired. During the period that
26 property and tenancy management were divided between Ingkerreke Commercial and
27 CAAHC respectively, CAAHC (2016, p. 6) narrated that a repair request would *ideally*
28 proceed as follows:
29
30

- 31 1. Tenant reports repair to CAAHC (TM Contractor)
32
- 33 2. CAAHC reports repairs to Housing
34
- 35 3. Housing issues work order to Ingkerreke (PM Contractor)
36

- 1
- 2
- 3 4. Ingerreke contact tenant and complete work
- 4
- 5 5. Ingerreke invoice Housing for work
- 6
- 7 6. Housing pay invoice.
- 8
- 9

10 This process lacked quality assurance mechanisms and produced inefficiencies, confusion
11 over responsibilities, and miscommunications (Crabtree, 2016). Specifically, once CAAHC
12 had reported a property issue to the department, it could not discern whether a job had been
13 completed and was prohibited from directly contacting Ingkerreke, (CAAHC, 2016, p. 6).

14 Conversely, Ingkerreke CEO Mr Mathison complained that requests would become
15 ‘bottlenecked’ within the department: ‘at 4 o’clock in the afternoon we may receive 20 or 30
16 orders in that 10 to 15 minute period . . . Friday afternoon, Monday morning, those sort of
17 things’ (PAC, 2016iii, p. 43). In such scenarios, tenants become the *de facto* point of
18 continuity, communicating with separate tenancy and property managers and obliged to be
19 always available. CAAHC (2016, p. 4) stated of the tenancy services contract that ‘The
20 arrangement was riddled with inefficiencies, double handling, red tape and processes that
21 delayed good outcomes. Where CAAHC was expected to act with relative urgency there was
22 little reciprocal urgency offered to us by NT Housing’.

23 The Inquiry describes that in only six years there were three configurations of contractors
24 responsible for property and tenancy management. CAAHC held the initial contract for two
25 years, before Ingkerreke and CAAHC held contracts lasting 37 months, which were
26 superseded by 16 month contracts awarded to Tangentyere Constructions and Zodiac
27 Business Services. At the hearings, department executives struggled to explain the
28 inconsistent length of contracts (PAC, 2016ii, p. 18). The short length of contracts, and their
29 month-to-month extension, has obvious implications for service providers’ staff retention and
30 development. Nonetheless, the tender process is serialized on the basis that, over a designated
31 period, there will be no more than one contractor for each service. This has led to a
32 situation where the department has to manage three contractors simultaneously, which
33 is problematic given the lack of quality assurance mechanisms and the potential for
34 confusion over responsibilities and miscommunications.

1
2
3 period, a competitor may become better placed to provide a service. While a cyclical repairs
4 and maintenance regime establishes the routinized labour necessary for skills development
5 and the storage of organizational knowledge (Jacobs *et al.* 2011), this system instead
6
7 consolidates the bureaucratic and contractor capacities to audit reporting and re-tender for
8 work. For public servants and service providers alike, it discourages an ethnographic
9 understanding of the problems property management regimes aim to address by assessing
10 performance against measurable indicators (Lea, 2012), including the execution of
11 documentary requirements and busy work required by the contract (Gurran & Phibbs, 2016).
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 The repetition of tenders for housing contracts involves minor differences in contract
25 conditions (Deleuze, 2001) – such as their length, remuneration, performance criteria, and
26 extension provisions – as policies are refined and funding squabbles between governments
27 occur. In determining who should be awarded a contract, cost and efficacy, including cultural
28 appropriateness, will be different weighted. Thus in 2016 Zodiac Business Services tendered
29 at less than half of the proposed costs outlined by the CAAHC and was awarded the tenancies
30 management contract. CAAHC CEO Ms Langton defended the company's higher bid as the
31 proper cost of town camp tenancy services:
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 What we tendered for in our new service model was a very holistic service that
43 included things like community engagement, support coordination, specialist debt
44 collection, getting money through the door, and a range of other things that would
45 have been pleasing for housing. (PAC, 2016ii, p. 52)

46
47 Tangentyere Council CEO Mr Shaw expressed further frustration that a for-profit 'book
48 keeping company' had been awarded work over a local, Aboriginal-controlled housing
49 organization with a stake in long-term community development: 'The concern that a lot of
50 people have gotten is that they really want a generational socioeconomic framework so there
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 are social outcomes affixed to housing on the town camps' (PAC, 2016iii, p. 34). Against the
4
5 imagined vices of a monopoly service, the staccato repetition of the tender process
6
7 undermines any consolidation of proven processes, professional expertise, and local
8
9 relationships, all of which require time to accrue and are necessary to hold houses together.
10
11
12
13
14

15 The scheduled ends of short-term service contracts might be effectively managed by reliable
16
17 government oversight. But the Inquiry also described the extensive restructuring and
18
19 personnel turnover within the department responsible for overseeing the tender model.
20
21

22 Between 2012 and 2016, the department 'had four different Ministers, with the longest tenure
23
24 being 16 months, and it ... had a different Chief Executive for each of its three Annual
25
26 Reports' (PAC, 2016i, p. 66). This dynamism is highlighted further by the *Report's* 'Table 5',
27
28 reproduced below as Figure 1. For inexperienced Ministers, executive staff, and mobile
29
30 bureaucrats, a new tender process can appear as an opportunity to rectify apparent neglect
31
32 with new arrangements, rather than the most recent instance of repeated reinvention that is
33
34 neglect's cause.
35
36

37
38
39
40 [Insert Figure 1 here]
41
42
43
44

45 *The Condition Report and Waiting*

46
47
48

49 The third and final legal-bureaucratic instrument that this article draws attention to is the
50
51 condition report, which the Inquiry also considered for its role in maintaining houses at Alice
52
53 Springs town camps. The housing condition report describes the state of the property via a
54
55 checklist of items completed by a tenancy manager. Its completion is underpinned by the
56
57 requirement to meet minimum standards specified in the *Residential Tenancies Act 1999*
58
59
60

(NT). While typically completed at least at the commencement and conclusion of a tenancy, the tenancy services contracts at Alice Springs town camps also required quarterly property inspections. Pre-tenancy in particular, the condition report is the key technology by which a prospective tenant can identify housing faults and require their remediation prior to signing a tenancy agreement. After that, a tenant may identify a housing fault through direct contact with a tenancy manager, who would lodge a maintenance request with the department on the tenant's behalf. Following a tenancy's commencement, identified housing faults are more likely to be presumed related to tenant damage than housing's entropic tendency.

Empirically, the bargaining power of a prospective tenant is significantly undermined in Alice Springs town camps by severe housing undersupply and extensive public housing waiting lists. More than a straightforward instrument of representation (Hull, 2012), the utility of the condition report for tenants depends on what housing hardware is assessed and by what methods, and on the efficacy of remediation instigated by the identification of housing failures. An Inquiry submission by CAAHC (2016) described an instance at Larapinta Valley town camp where the department had declared pre-tenancy vacancy works completed but a young mother with two children arrived at her new house to the words 'Fuck you' graffitied across exterior walls (Figure 2). Another submission by the Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service (CAALAS, 2016, p. 4) described a client's situation at Hoppy's town camp where the condition report from May 2015 'recommended that, amongst other things, the cracks in the blockwork above the entry door and the sagging ceiling lining required rectification as a matter of priority for reasons of structural safety'. In December 2015, this tenant's ceiling collapsed onto her dining room table.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

The Inquiry described that in situations where housing faults were identified by a condition report, or through subsequent repair requests, delays in fixwork were often attributable to bureaucratic categories distinguishing breakdowns. The department used the categories 'emergency', 'immediate', 'urgent', and 'routine' to distinguish repairs, with the associated requirement that such work be attended to immediately, within four hours, two days, and ten days respectively. The department's former maintenance manual stated that

Only that type of work which is related to your health, safety or security or which affects the structure of the property will be attended to in a responsive manner. All other maintenance requests will be deferred and completed in a planned way depending on the priority and availability of funding. (PAC, 2016i, pp. 37-38).

Submissions noted that once property and tenancy management contracts were separated, work was rarely completed within time requirements and tenants often 'lived with the housing defect for not just months, but years' (CAAHC, 2016, pp. 2-3).

The accounts in the Inquiry showed that it takes sustained tenant vigilance to determine and pursue incomplete work orders. In addition to bottlenecks for work orders, delays were also attributed to a departmental perception that certain defects, such as broken doors, were presumed *a priori* caused by tenant damage (rather than fair wear and tear), and thus no work order was delivered to the property manager (PAC, 2016i, p. 40). Such adjudications were opaque, with the property manager unaware of any items from a tenancy manager maintenance request left off their work order. Ingkerreke CEO Mr Mathison suggested that the department 'had a policy I suppose, for lack of better words, where tenant damage was not being responded to' (PAC, 2016iii, p. 43). He described that

1
2
3 If somebody rang up CAAHC and reported an incident and said look there is a broken
4 door, broken tap and a broken light switch. By the time it gets to us we might have
5 gone out and fixed the broken light switch and tap, but maybe not the door because it
6
7 was assumed that it was deemed tenant damage. (PAC, 2016iii, p. 43)

8
9
10 Even where domestic hardware is recognized as damaged, tenants were frustrated by the
11 unwillingness of the department to generate work orders for broken air conditioners, hot
12 water services, and stoves. The former maintenance manual deemed 'A stove with one of
13 four elements working [to be] partially operable and therefore [it] won't be replaced' (PAC,
14 2016i, p. 37).

15
16
17
18
19 Delays in attending to housing failures are significant in accelerating related breakdowns and,
20 where a house becomes uninhabitable, breakdowns in neighbors' houses as residents shift
21 and crowding increases. In a different context, the remote community of Galiwinku, NT,
22 Inquiry submissions made by the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (NAAJA,
23 2016, p. 25) described that the department responded to a housing complaint regarding a
24 broken door by advising that a contractor would only fly to that remote community when 20
25 to 30 doors required fixing, as 'non-urgent repairs'. In the meantime, residents must live in
26 insecure properties, an issue also identified by Tangentyere Council (2016, p. 47): 'We have
27 no security at all. We have made formal complaints about the flimsy screens and the fact that
28 they can be easily cut and opened by hand'. Both the end of a lease and scheduled inspections
29 are liable to attribute such breakdowns to tenant damage. CAALAS (2016) noted that arrears
30 for public housing repairs, often alleged and recorded without proof of tenant responsibility,
31 have the effect of impeding tenants' subsequent applications for public housing, generating
32 bureaucratic disputes years later. This failure to respond to breakdowns responsively effaces
33 the contribution of domestic crowding (itself an effect of housing undersupply and delays in
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 approving tenancies) to the accelerated dilapidation of housing, which is instead interpreted
4 as tenant damage.
5
6
7
8
9

10 In this context, the Inquiry describes how some tenants cease reporting housing failures and
11 that waiting becomes a deterrent to pursue public housing altogether. The CEO of another
12 housing provider told the Inquiry that 'If you do not fix things quickly people stop reporting'
13 (PAC, 2016iii, p. 4), while Tangentyere Council CEO Mr Shaw described that 'We don't
14 have any confidence in the process or in the Territory Housing as our landlord. Our members
15 have given up ringing and reporting repairs and maintenance issues now' (Tangentyere, 2016,
16 p. 3). In seeking to have the faults specified on condition reports remedied, the property
17 management regime in Alice Springs town camps depends on a presumption that tenants
18 have unlimited time to perform the 'sub-waits' (Whelan, 2019, p. 9) of housing fixwork:
19 calling the department and Centrelink, pursuing legal representation, and waiting for housing
20 maintenance officers, even while new breakdowns accrue. This expectation that residents
21 wait also applies to new tenancies, following pre-tenancy inspections and the completion of
22 condition reports. CAAHC (2016, p. 8) described to the Inquiry that five tenants continued to
23 wait for their housing despite having paid their security deposits and first month's rent three
24 months earlier. Hoag (2014, p. 411) characterizes this as 'dereliction', where waiting assumes
25 the form of 'a liminal state between the policy and the practice of that policy'. While tenants
26 waited, houses stood empty, or eventually attracted the homeless into informal tenancies
27 (PAC, 2016i). In this context, condition reports are necessary to determine the inadequacies
28 of housing in relation to legislative standards. However, operationalized within the
29 governance regimes at Alice Springs town camps, they are just as likely to justify perennial
30 delays for landlord repairs and maintenance, or to constitute evidence used for claiming
31 tenant damage in the future.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Beyond Bureaucracy?

This article has described how particular legal-bureaucratic instruments employed within housing management at Alice Springs town camps exacerbate housing's entropy. These instruments generate particular temporalizations: circumscribing periods of action and inaction, requiring routines and repetitions, and structuring legal obligations and social relations in housing governance. The lease offers the promise of government housing and infrastructure provision but demands that communities submit to long-term regimes of perennial system change. The tender establishes the hypothetical potential for the most effective service providers to be contracted, and the freedom to discontinue such arrangements, but its repetition undermines staff retention, service continuity, and the development of Indigenous corporations with a stake in community development. The condition report is the foremost protection for residents against the provision of rental properties that are unsafe or uninhabitable, yet it has functioned as a means of displacing liability for housing failures onto tenants. The reliability and length of Commonwealth and NT government funding agreements bear on the impact of each of these instruments – locking traditional owners into potentially unfunded agreements, underpinning whether contracts for service provision are long enough to develop effective systems and relationships, and determining whether there are sufficient resources to respond to residents' requests for necessary fixwork.

Noting how such instruments disrupt and delay satisfactory housing situations for town camp residents, Tangentyere Council's (2016) submissions made a case for a return to community-

1
2
3 controlled housing. This alternative governance model haunts much of the Inquiry's
4 description of state failures to maintain Indigenous housing, and how systems might be
5 reformed. PAC member MLP Wood mused that 'Historically we seem to go around in circles
6 sometimes with housing. Housing associations were quite the in thing many years ago' (PAC,
7 2016ii, p. 29). Community control is back at the forefront of policy discourse in the NT,
8 including in the department's (2020) recent housing strategy which commits to a long-term
9 transfer of housing services to Aboriginal organisations. More immediate is the demand by
10 the four land councils for the government to support a new Aboriginal-controlled housing
11 model, overseen by a new statutory body and involving regional housing organizations (CLC,
12 2020). Research on community land trust principles for Indigenous housing (Crabtree *et al.*,
13 2016), and the Groote Archipelago Local Decision Making Agreement, offer alternative
14 models to existing government management of housing on town camps.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32 Any shift to community-controlled housing in Alice Springs town camps is nevertheless
33 unlikely to cease forms of bureaucratic housing management, including the use of the
34 instruments described above. In its most tenant-centered application, a condition report
35 remains the means by which housing is surveyed to determine necessary repairs for increased
36 resident health outcomes. In other Australian jurisdictions, community-controlled housing
37 providers regularly tender for work where internal expertise is limited. Subleasing
38 arrangements would require significant legal negotiation or dispute to be set aside.
39
40 Bureaucracy does not disappear with community control, though its impact on the rhythms of
41 social production could be significantly reformed. Drawing on the analysis here, further work
42 might investigate the role of tenders and condition reports in proposed community housing
43 models, including how these can be implemented in ways that enable improved outcomes for
44 tenants.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6 However, the convention to conclude with speculative proposals for alternative arrangements
7 should be curbed here, to sustain attention to path dependencies, ongoing agreements, sunk
8 costs, and institutionalized concerns. Government departments do not typically relinquish
9 control or pursue their own redundancy, except where a problem is deemed especially
10 difficult to manage, and thus attractive to outsource. Perennial evaluation and proposal also
11 hold things in place. Thus on the second day of the Inquiry's public hearings the then-
12 Country Liberal Party coalition government announced an independent review of NT town
13 camps. The review's due date was scheduled six months from this announcement, two
14 months following an upcoming election. Its remit would be broader than the PAC Inquiry
15 terms of reference, in which CLP members of parliament had chosen not to participate. This
16 review would finally satisfy the government's obligation under the town camp subleases.
17 Awarding the tender to a private consultancy firm and subcontracted again, this work led in
18 2017 to the *Living on the Edge: Northern Territory Town Camps Review* (DHCD, 2017),
19 released in 2018 due to its unwieldy 16,000 pages. *Living on the Edge* is an unparalleled
20 survey of NT infrastructure, at times meticulous in its record of the poor state of town camp
21 housing and infrastructure. Yet for many Indigenous people living in houses surveyed as
22 substandard, the review is, also, a bureaucratic technique of delay. As Tangentyere Council
23 CEO Mr Shaw put it at the Inquiry hearings: 'A lot of Aboriginal people – and I am joined
24 here by my board – are fed up and have had enough of reviews. . . Reviews are not worth the
25 paper they are written on, as far as they are and I am concerned' (PAC, 2016iii, p. 29).
26 Because there is no escaping bureaucracy for effective Indigenous corporations working to
27 hold governments to their promises, Tangentyere Council had nonetheless 'been pursuing this
28 review for years' (p. 25).
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Works Cited

Altman, J. (2013) Arguing the Intervention, *Journal of Indigenous Policy*, (14), pp. 1-158.

Appel, H. (2018) Infrastructural time. In Anand, N., Appel, H., & Gupta, A. (Eds) *The Promise of Infrastructure*, pp. 41-60 (Durham: Duke University Press).

Arrigoitia, M.F. (2014) UnMaking public housing towers, *The Journal of Architecture, Design and Domestic Space*, 11(2), pp. 167-196.

Bear, L. (2016) Time as technique, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 45: 487-502.

Braun, B. & Whatmore, S. (2010) The stuff of politics: an introduction. In Braun, B. & Whatmore, S. (Eds) *Political Matter, Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life*, pp. ix-xl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

CAAHC (2016) *Submission to Public Accounts Committee. Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory*, 15 March (Alice Springs: Central Australian Affordable Housing Company).

CAALAS (2016) *Submission to the Public Accounts Committee, Legislative Assembly of the NT*, March (Alice Springs: Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service).

Central Land Council (2020) NT land councils: Governments must commit to new community housing model. <https://www.clc.org.au/media-releases/article/nt-land-councils-governments-must-commit-to-new-community-housing-model>

COAG (2008) *National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing* (Canberra: Council of Australian Governments).

Commonwealth of Australia (2017) *Remote Housing Review: A Review of the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing and the Remote Housing Strategy (2008-2018)* (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet).

1
2
3 Coughlan, F. (1991) *Aboriginal Town Camps and Tangentyere Council: The Battle for Self-*
4 *Determination in Alice Springs* (Bundoora: La Trobe University).

5
6
7 Crabtree, L., Moore, N., Phibbs, P., Blunden, H. & Sappideen, C. (2015) *Community Land*
8
9 *Trusts and Indigenous Communities: From Strategies to Outcomes*. AHURI Final Report
10
11 No. 239 (Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute).

12
13
14 Crabtree, L. (2016) *Submission to Public Accounts Committee 14 March 2016* (Sydney:
15
16 Western Sydney University).

17
18
19 Cross, J. (2015) The economy of anticipation: hope, infrastructure, and economic zones in
20
21 South India, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 35(3), pp.
22
23 424-437.

24
25
26 Das, V. (1997) *Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India*
27
28 (Delhi: Oxford University Press).

29
30
31 Deleuze, G. (2001) *Difference and Repetition* (London: Continuum).

32
33 Department of Housing and Community Development (2017) *Living on the Edge: Northern*
34
35 *Territory Town Camps Review*, May (Deloitte. Northern Territory Government).

36
37 Department of Local Government, Housing and Community Development (2020) *A Home*
38
39 *for All Territorians: Northern Territory Housing Strategy 2020-2025* (Darwin: Northern
40
41 Territory Government).

42
43 Fisher, W. (1997) Doing good? The politics and antipolitics of NGO practices, *Annual*
44
45 *Review of Anthropology*, 26, pp. 439-464.

46
47
48 Goetz, E.G. (2013) *New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice and Public Housing Policy*
49
50 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

51
52 Graham, C. (2009) Macklin's town camp takeover derailed by big guns, *Crikey*, 31 July.

53
54
55 Graham, S. & Thrift, N. (2007) Out of order: understanding repair and maintenance, *Theory*,
56
57 *Culture & Society*, 24(3), pp. 1-25.

58
59
60

1
2
3 Grealy, L. & Lea, T. (2020). Housing waste. In Allon, F. Barcan, R. & Eddison-Cogan, K.
4 (Eds) *The Temporalities of Waste*, pp. 75-86 (London: Routledge).
5
6 Gurran, N. & Phibbs, P. (2015) Are governments really interested in fixing the housing
7 problem? Policy capture and busy work in Australia. *Housing Studies*, 30(5): 711-729.
8
9 Habibis D., Phillips, R., & Phibbs, P. (2019) Housing policy in remote Indigenous
10 communities: how politics obstructs good policy, *Housing Studies*, 34(2), pp. 252-271
11
12 Haraway, D. (2016) *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham:
13 Duke University Press).
14
15 Hoag, C. (2014) Dereliction at the South African Department of Home Affairs: time for the
16 anthropology of bureaucracy, *Critique of Anthropology*, 34(4), pp. 410-428.
17
18 Howey, K. (2020) The Ranger Uranium Mine agreement revisited: spacetimes of Indigenous
19 agreement-making in Australia, *Transformations*, (33), pp. 96-115.
20
21 Hull, M. (2012) Documents and bureaucracy, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 41, pp. 251-
22
23 267.
24
25 Jacobs, J. & Cairns, S. (2011) Ecologies of dwelling: Maintaining high-rise housing in
26 Singapore. In Bridge, G. & Watson, S. (Eds) *The New Blackwell Companion to the City*,
27 pp. 79-95 (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.).
28
29 Kafka, B. (2009) Paperwork: the state of the discipline, *Book History*, 12, pp. 340-353.
30
31 Lea, T. (2012) When looking for anarchy, look to the state: Fantasies of regulation in forcing
32 disorder within the Australian Indigenous estate. *Critique of Anthropology*, 32(2): 109-
33
34 124.
35
36 Lea, T. (2020) *Indigeneity and the Unruly Logics of Intervention* (Stanford: Stanford
37 University Press).
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Lea, T. (2021) Staying with the state: Prefiguring capacities for change within Indigenous
4 social policy. In Strakosch, E., Lahn, J. & Sullivan, P (Eds) *Bureaucratic Occupation: 5
6 Government and First Nations Peoples in Australia* (London: Routledge)
7
8
9
10 Lerner, S. (2012) *Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United 11
12 States* (Cambridge: MIT Press).
13
14 Murphy, M. (2006) *Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty* (Durham: Duke
15 University Press).
16
17
18 NAAJA (2016) *Northern Territory Housing Issues Paper and Response to the Housing
20
21 Strategy Consultation Draft*, February (Darwin: North Australian Aboriginal Justice
22
23 Agency).
24
25 Nethercote, M. (2015) Operationalizing a responsibility agenda in Australia's Indigenous
26 communities: confused, doubtful and subversive public housing tenants, *Housing, Theory
27
28 and Society*, 32(2), pp. 171-195.
29
30
31 Nixon, R. (2011) *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Cambridge: Harvard
32 University Press).
33
34
35 Public Accounts Committee (2016i) *Report on Repairs and Maintenance of Housing on
36
37 Town Camps*, May (Darwin: Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory).
38
39
40 Public Accounts Committee (2016ii) *Public Hearing Transcript into Housing Repairs and
41
42 Maintenance on Town Camps*, 2 March (Darwin: Legislative Assembly of the Northern
43
44 Territory).
45
46
47 Public Accounts Committee (2016iii) *Inquiry into Housing Repairs and Maintenance on
48
49 Town Camps Public Hearing Transcript*, 11 April (Darwin: Legislative Assembly of the
50
51 Northern Territory).
52
53
54 Pholeros, P. & Phibbs, P. (2012) Constructing and maintaining houses. Research sheet No.
55
56 13. Closing the Gap Clearing House (Canberra: Australian Government).
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Pholeros, P., Rainow, S., & Torzillo, P. (1993) *Housing for Health: Towards a Healthy*
4
5 *Living Environment for Aboriginal People* (Newport: Healthabitat).
6
7
8 Povinelli, E. (2011) *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late*
9
10 *Liberalism* (Durham: Duke University Press).
11
12 Seicshnaydre, S. (2016) Missed opportunity: furthering fair housing in the Housing Choice
13
14 Voucher Program, *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 79, pp. 173-197.
15
16 Shapiro, N. (2015) Attuning to the chemosphere: domestic formaldehyde, bodily reasoning,
17
18 and the chemical sublime, *Cultural Anthropology*, 30(3), pp. 368-393.
19
20 Simpson, A. (2016) Consent's revenge, *Cultural Anthropology*, 31(3), pp. 326-333.
21
22 Stoler, A. (2013) 'The rot remains': From ruins to ruination. In Stoler, A. (Ed.) *Imperial*
23
24 *Debris: On Ruins and Ruination*, pp. 1-35 (Durham: Duke University Press).
25
26 Tangentyere Council (2016) *Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory Public Accounts*
27
28 Committee Inquiry into Housing Repairs and Maintenance on Town Camps, 15 March
29
30 (Alice Springs: Tangentyere Council Aboriginal Corporation).
31
32
33 Tangentyere Council (2020). About Tangentyere Council. Accessed on 2 July at
34
35 <https://www.tangentyere.org.au/about/>
36
37 Terrill, L. (2009) The days of the failed collective, *UNSW Law Journal*, 32(3), pp. 814-851.
38
39 Valverde, M. (2015). *Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance* (Abingdon &
40
41 New York: Routledge).
42
43 Vigh, H. (2008). Crisis and chronicity: anthropological perspectives on continuous conflict
44
45 and decline, *Ethnos*, 73(1), pp. 5-24.
46
47 Vivian, A. (2010). Some human rights are worth more than others: The Northern Territory
48
49 Intervention and the Alice Springs town camps, *Alternative Law Journal*, 35(1), pp. 13-
50
51 17.
52
53
54 Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Whelan, A. (2019) 'Ask for more time': big data chronopolitics in the Australian welfare
4
5 bureaucracy, *Critical Sociology*, n.p.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Peer Review Only

Governing Disassembly

ABSTRACT *Without proper attention, houses disassemble. In public housing, property management regimes are charged with performing the repairs and maintenance necessary to combat this entropic tendency. This article argues that such governance regimes can accelerate housing's disassembly, through rules that restrict housing interventions, bureaucratic technologies that misrecognize housing failure, and processes that defer and delay necessary fixwork. It analyzes Indigenous housing in the Northern Territory of Australia, in terms of three specific legal-bureaucratic instruments and the temporalizations they constitute: the lease and promise; the tender and repetition; the condition report and waiting. The article considers the effects of these pairings in Alice Springs town camps and the challenge of thinking beyond bureaucratic housing regimes.*

KEY WORDS: Housing, policy, maintenance, temporality, property management

Without proper attention, housing disassembles. While housing breakdown is inevitable, its trajectory is hardly predictable. A pipe bursts, a toilet blocks, windows crack, an oven breaks, taps calcify, mold grows, formaldehyde exhales, rats chew, termites burrow, and any originary failure can manifest a series of distributed effects requiring intervention. To build a house is to seal the fate of perennial repairs and maintenance.

The form that housing remediation takes typically depends on legal tenure – the historical ossification of rights and obligations to repair broken things. Owner-occupiers with liquid capital employ a local tradesperson, or head to the hardware store and then perform some

1
2
3 DIY. Tenants in private rentals debate whether to contact their landlord, weighing the
4
5 complaint against the threat of increased rent or eviction. Similarly, public housing tenants
6
7 might submit a request to the property manager responsible for maintaining their
8
9 accommodation to legal minimum standards. In all cases, residents are vulnerable to the skill
10
11 and depth of fixwork, the efficacy of guidelines and regulatory oversight, and the perpetual
12
13 but sporadic deconstruction of domestic environments.
14
15

16
17
18 This article is focused on public housing tenancies in the Northern Territory (NT) of
19
20 Australia. It provides a concrete analysis of particular legal-bureaucratic instruments
21
22 operating in a specific context: the Alice Springs town camps. Following Valverde (2015, p.
23
24 2), the language of 'concrete analysis' rather than case study aims to avoids any implication
25
26 that the description exemplifies general theoretical concepts or homogenous, coherent,
27
28 higher-level policy intentions. This is important because governance arrangements in Alice
29
30 Springs town camps are different to those at other NT town camps, and from arrangements at
31
32 other remote communities, in urban public tenancies, or on Indigenous homelands, let alone
33
34 other Australian state and territory jurisdictions. Generic policy instruments appear across
35
36 multiple contexts, and are implemented according to common social and political goals.
37
38 However, the critical tendency to scale analyses to system-level explanatory forces such as
39
40 neoliberalism, late capitalism, settler-colonialism, and postlate-industrialism, while politically
41
42 useful, rarely illuminates how governance practically unfurls in particular places. Holding
43
44 such diagnoses at bay is significant not simply as a matter of accurate description, but on
45
46 behalf of understanding the networks into which alternative programs – reformist or radical –
47
48 might effectively intervene.
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 This article argues that governance regimes are central to the poor condition of much state
4 supplied Indigenous housing. ~~Through close analysis of the 2016 NT Public Accounts~~
5 ~~Committee Inquiry into Housing Repairs and Maintenance on Town Camps, it considers how~~
6 ~~housing's disassembly is occasionally delayed, but more often accelerated and exacerbated~~
7 ~~by housing management systems. This article~~
8 ~~In doing so, it~~ models an argument for detailed
9 attention to *how* technologies of governance accelerate housing breakdown.¹ ~~It responds as a~~
10 ~~response to academic analyses that offer provide cursory summations of the poor state of~~
11 Indigenous housing in order to offer recommendations for new principles, guidelines,
12 surveys, working groups, funding, and so on – as though the introduction of those reforms
13 will be either easily won or actionable without compromise or novel ill-effects. This is not a
14 rejection of the optimism inherent in proposals for more just or effective policies, or even, as
15 Lea (2012, p. 120) aptly diagnoses, an argument about the 'remedial circularity' of self-
16 sustaining government bureaucracy and academic critique. I argue that any such proposal
17 must begin with a thorough understanding of the techniques of existing regimes and how
18 these might be reformed, redeployed, or set aside in any newly proposed configuration. Call
19 it staying with the trouble (Haraway, 2016), staying with the state (Lea, 2021), or wading
20 through the banal detail of everyday governance. This requires attending to how the present is
21 underpinned by conflicting legacies that orient and constrain the potential impact of
22 contemporary policy and activism alike.

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49 Through close analysis of the 2016 NT Public Accounts Committee *Inquiry into Housing*
50 *Repairs and Maintenance on Town Camps*, this article considers how housing's disassembly
51 is occasionally delayed, but more often accelerated and exacerbated by governance regimes.
52
53 Attention to the detail of how property and tenancy management systems oversee the
54 disassembly of housing focuses here on ~~The complexity of housing governance, and indeed~~
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 the potential for effective interventions that would reform existing practices, is considered by
4 focusing on housing in Alice Springs town camps in terms of three specific legal-bureaucratic
5 instruments and the temporalizations they constitute for houses and their tenants at Alice
6
7 Springs town camps. These are: the lease and promise; the tender and repetition; and the
8 condition report and waiting. The description that follows shows how such techniques of
9 attention and intervention can contribute to housing's entropy, suggesting pause for analyses
10 that, by exposing government negligence, conclude a need for greater oversight. In contrast to
11 analyses that perform the maneuver of critical exposure and demand greater oversight, this
12 article suggests that techniques of attention can contribute to housing's entropy. The
13 conclusion nevertheless reflects on the utility, if not inevitability, of those instruments for
14 effective housing governance and the generative potential of substandard housing for ongoing
15 interventions.

30 31 Disassembly

32
33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40 In the United States, disinvestment from necessary repairs and maintenance accelerated the
41 dilapidation of public housing towers in a process of active neglect or '*de facto* demolition'
42 (Arrigoitia, 2014, p. 173). This process, legitimated calls to condemn public housing and
43 the transition to a system of state subsidized vouchers for the private rental market
44 (Seicshnaydre, 2016). Much analysis of such phenomena situates their progress within
45 governments' increasingly neoliberal welfare policies, hastened by corporate lobbying for
46 profitable development (Goetz, 2013). In contrast, Indigenous housing in the Northern
47 Territory (NT) has in recent years shifted to a mostly public system. This system has been
48 subject to significant Commonwealth and NT government expenditure on residential
49

1
2
3 construction, under the ‘Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program’ (SIHIP),
4
5 the *National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing* (NPARIH), and the
6
7 ongoing ‘Our Community. Our Future. Our Homes.’ (OCOFOH) programs.
8
9

10
11 2007 was a pivotal year for this intensification of state involvement in Indigenous housing in
12 the NT, including the assumption of ~~legal~~ obligations as landlord that play out in Alice
13 Springs across the following decade. Housing in regional and remote communities that was
14 previously managed by Indigenous Community Housing Organizations (ICHOs) became the
15 object of Commonwealth, and quickly NT, governance via the Northern Territory National
16 Emergency Response (‘The Intervention’), and according to the broad goal of ‘normalising’
17 social service provision (~~Howey, 2014~~). Under the guise of concern for child sexual abuse,
18 the Commonwealth government exempted Intervention measures from the protections of the
19 *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* and without consultation passed a tranche of major reforms
20 in NT Indigenous communities (Altman, 2013). The breadth and ongoing impact of the
21 Intervention constitutes it as a critical event, in Das’s (1997) terms, as one that involves the
22 annihilation and recreation of worlds, including Indigenous people’s control over their
23 housing. While the programs and agreements listed above have increased housing stock and
24 marginally reduced crowding, a significant proportion of ~~Indigenous~~ town camp and remote
25 community housing ~~is still remains~~ in poor condition and requires refurbishment or
26 replacement (DHCD, 2017; Commonwealth, 2017).
27
28

29
30 51 This article does not assess the relative outcomes for housing under community versus
31 52 government management. Instead, it considers one of the key recommendations of the
32 53 Commonwealth’s (2017, p. 2) NPARIH review – ‘an increased emphasis on planned cyclic
34 54 maintenance’ to maintain existing housing stock – against one of the NPARIH’s original
35 55
36 56
37 57
38 58
39 59
40 60

1
2
3 goals: to 'Implement robust and standardized Property and Tenancy Management (PTM) of
4 all remote Indigenous housing' (COAG, 2008). That is, it places the recent recommendation
5 alongside the near-identical commitment from a decade prior. These are not juxtaposed ~~in~~
6
7 ~~order~~ to simply criticize government failure, but to highlight the distance between high-level
8 policy commitments (who but the most polemical commentator would argue against the need
9 for cyclical maintenance of public assets?) and everyday governance. Graham and Thrift
10 (2007, p. 5) suggest we might understand 'breakdown and failure as the means by which
11 societies learn and learn to re-produce', however there is nothing inevitable to such lessons.
12
13 In political announcements and policy design settings, property and tenancy management are
14 often subordinated to capital works, despite planned maintenance being long understood as
15 necessary for sustainable Indigenous housing (Pholeros *et al.*, 1993). However, even as
16 repairs and maintenance are increasingly proclaimed within policy frameworks and budgets,
17 the disassembly of Indigenous public housing continues to be underpinned by the legal-
18 bureaucratic instruments engendered by those governing regimes.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38 By disassembly, I mean the dilapidation, deterioration, decay, and breakdown that the
39 housing assemblage experiences from the point of construction. Such changes in form convey
40 the nature of housing as a *permeable membrane* that both shelters and sustains its inhabitants
41 while subjecting them to the dynamic effects of building materials and the surrounding
42 environment (Murphy, 2006; Shapiro, 2014). To paraphrase Braun and Whatmore (2010),
43 this is the *stuff* of housing politics that exposes housing as always 'housing-in-action' (Jacobs
44
45 *et al.*, 2011, p. 83). ~~shows housing to be less solid than the term 'structure' connotes.~~ While
46 housing metamorphoses are technically complex, unpredictable, multi-directional, and
47 variously sensible, inevitable processes of disassembly can be deferred by effective property
48 management. Paying adequate attention to *how* this form of quotidian governance unfolds,
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 this article eschews extended engagement with a vast literature offering diagnoses for spatial
4 zones of sacrifice, exploitation, and abandonment, and therefore relevant to the protracted
5 radical contingency of certain Indigenous housing contexts in central Australia (Povinelli,
6 2011; Lerner, 2012). Spatial constraints also limit a thorough review of It also sidesteps an
7 expanding literature on infrastructural time, including analyses of developmental and
8 extractive temporalities (Appel, 2018), and of the anticipatory character of infrastructural
9 projects (Cross, 2015) – though such work informs the following discussion. –

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 Instead, I turn to Vigh's description of crisis and chronicity to help frame the recent history of
22 Northern Territory town camp housing. For many people, Vigh (2008, p. 6) argues, 'crisis is
23 endemic rather than episodic and cannot be delineated as an aberrant moment of chaos or a
24 period of decisive change'. As such, the 'temporal persistence of [...] dysfunction' (Estroff in
25 Vigh, 2008, p. 10) forces people 'to make lives in fragmented and volatile worlds rather than
26 waiting for normalization and reconfiguration' (p. 8), attuning to and navigating disorder.

27
28
29
30 Applying this framing, we can see there is not simply a housing crisis in the NT; rather, the
31 instability, unpredictability, and continuity of housing insecurity is the long-term context
32 from which people (residents and property managers alike) interpret and act in the world.

33
34 This bears on determinations of acceptable standards, necessary oversight, timeliness, and
35 how dilapidated or cruddy something might become before housing's entropy is attended to.

36
37
38 While property and tenancy regimes instantiate an interventionist and stabilizing logic –
39 maintain assets and encourage resident sedentization – they have in fact contributed to this
40 perennial crisis-as-context. Such regimes have the potential to displace residents, not by
41 shifting them spatially (though they sometimes do), but by '[leaving] communities in a place
42 stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable' (Nixon, 2011, p. 19). Such

1
2
3 characteristics include community control over housing and the self-determination this
4
5 affords First Nations people even where property management presents a practical challenge.
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Narrowing from such useful abstractions as abandonment, slow violence, and ongoing crisis, property and tenancy management involves legal-bureaucratic instruments which undermine effective intervention through various obstructions, deferrals, delays, disincentives, and accelerations, and intensities. Policies enable generic instruments to unfurl in specific and sometimes unruly ways (Lea, 2020), constituting particular temporalizations: that is, organizing and ordering time according to the demands made of the subjects they govern.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Following Bear (2016, p. 492), this is 'time as technique' (or *techne*) in housing governance, where 'technologies of imagination ... are acts of creative, skillful making that intervene in our experiences of the passage of time and senses of agency'. Apart from the lease, the tender, and the condition report, there are numerous bureaucratic technologies involved in property management: titles, tenancy agreements, rental ledgers, work orders, employment contracts, construction standards, and so on. Bureaucratic instruments manipulate time to bring particular social worlds into being: setting temporal limits for contracts, programs, and eligibility; establishing the patterns and rhythms of interventions and their requirements; resurrecting biographies and precedents to adjudicate in the present; manifesting conditions of temporal scarcity or abundance; and revising, delaying, and accelerating the velocity of governance in general.

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
The myriad ways that time might be manipulated by bureaucratic instruments indicate the variability of property and tenancy management regimes, even within a jurisdiction. In the NT, housing quality is chiefly governed by the *Residential Tenancies Act 1999* (NT), which sets (undefined) standards for security, habitability, and cleanliness (Grealy & Lea, 2020).

1
2
3 Maintaining housing stock to meet legislative standards, where a residential tenancy
4
5 agreement is in place, is the chief requirement of property management. Pholeros and Phibbs
6
7 (2012) argue that best practice housing maintenance approaches include: utilizing the
8
9 *National Indigenous Housing Guide*; prioritizing safety and health issues; employing
10
11 environmentally appropriate materials and techniques; consulting with local communities and
12
13 employing local labour; and implementing multiple inspections to ensure high standards. Yet
14
15 any such list belies the empirical tribulations of instituting guidelines, establishing oversight,
16
17 training personnel, and guaranteeing funding to protect hard-won gains. In the NT, particular
18
19 challenges include access to licensed contractors, the cost of remote procurement, limited
20
21 rental revenue, employment and training requirements, population increase and mobility, and
22
23 environmental factors (Fien & Charlesworth, 2012). Bureaucrats, service providers, asset
24
25 managers, and maintenance officers face such challenges within systems underpinned by
26
27 contradictory logics regarding the rights and obligations of residents to housing. The failure
28
29 of property management to combat disassembly is thus not simply attributable to an absence
30
31 of effort or the malintent of professionals involved. even if, as Lea (2012) argues, the
32
33 reproduction of Indigenous communities as anarchic is necessary to justify the continuity of
34
35 government intervention.

41
42
43
44 The following section provides a concrete analysis of governance within a specific context:
45
46 the Alice Springs town camps. It is divided into three sub-sections that each pair a particular
47
48 legal-bureaucratic instrument with a related figure of temporal subjection: the lease and
49
50 promise; the tender and repetition; and the condition report and waiting. The lease, the tender,
51
52 and the condition report are governmental instruments designed to specify obligations for
53
54 housing provision, designate responsibility for remediating shortcomings, and survey the
55
56

1
2
3 state of those assets. These are instruments for managing the disassembling tendency of
4 housing, but which the analysis shows can actually accelerate breakdown.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12 Things Fall Apart 13

14
15
16
17 **The following**This analysis is based on the 2016 *Inquiry into Housing Repairs and*
18 *Maintenance on Town Camps* (hereafter Inquiry). The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is
19 designed to scrutinize government spending, and this Inquiry was driven by the NT
20 government obligation to review town camp infrastructure every three years, alongside
21
22 'growing concerns about the condition of housing on town camps and repairs and
23 maintenance not being completed within a reasonable period of time' (PAC, 2016i, p. 11).
24
25 The NT government had assumed responsibility for some town camp housing following the
26 Intervention, but had failed to meet its review obligation for six years.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38 The PAC Inquiry sought:

39 To inquire into and report on the repairs and maintenance of housing on town camps in
40 the Northern Territory, with particular regard to:
41
42 (a) Timeliness of completing repairs
43
44 (b) Costs of repairs; and
45
46 (c) Consistency, accessibility and efficiency of administrative arrangements (PAC,
47 2016i, p. 10).

48
49 Among numerous evaluations of NT housing, the Inquiry is unusual for its sustained
50 objectification of the systems charged with managing and maintaining housing. At the time of
51 the Inquiry, subleasing arrangements meant that the NT Department of Housing (hereafter the
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 department) was administratively responsible for housing at 17 town camps at Alice Springs
4 (including 284 houses), contracting third-party providers for housing management services.
5
6
7
8
9

10 Alice Springs is the largest town in Central Australia, situated about ~~fifteen hundred~~^{1,500}
11 kilometres from the northern city of Darwin and South Australia's capital, Adelaide. Home to
12 about 25,000 people, Alice Springs is a regional hub for surrounding remote communities
13 and the town camps on its immediate periphery. These camps emerged in the late-nineteenth
14 century as pastoralists displaced Indigenous people from their traditional ~~country~~^{lands}
15 towards the town's fringes. Aboriginal people were prohibited entry into Alice Springs from
16 1928 to 1964 unless they possessed an employment permit, and town camps were destroyed
17 at least four times between 1929 and 1960 (Coughlan, 1991). Securing tenure to town camp
18 lands surrounding Alice Springs was a major political victory for Indigenous people,
19 achieved through the serial recognition of individual housing associations as leaseholders
20 from the 1970s onwards. Vivian (2010, p. 15) describes that
21
22

23 In contrast to the systematic cultural destruction imposed by church run missions and
24 government settlements, [at town camps] children were not placed in dormitories,
25 Aboriginal languages were not forbidden, cooking was not restricted to communal
26 dining rooms and life was not regimented.
27
28

29 The Inquiry thus provides an important picture of the effects of state intervention that was not
30 requested, and which in the name of securing state access to assets has undercut hard-won
31 rights of Indigenous people ~~to their world~~.
32
33

34
35 ~~The following~~^{This} analysis of repair and maintenance regimes is mediated by the Inquiry's
36 materials. In addition to the *Report on Repairs and Maintenance of Housing on Town Camps*
37 (PAC, 2016i), this includes 11 written submissions, transcripts of two days of public
38
39

1
2
3 hearings, answers to written questions and questions taken on notice, and associated media
4 releases. Such documentary genres effect obvious exclusions and provide variously reliable
5 accounts of town camp governance.²⁵ But taken together these texts indicate the
6 administrative obstacles to adequate housing outcomes. It is tempting to characterize this
7 analysis as an ethnography of documents (Hull, 2012), but while the specificity and
8 embeddedness of documents within housing management is considered in detail, the chief
9 focus is with looking through the contents of paperwork rather than at the material forms of
10 documentation (Kafka, 2009). That said, the conclusion considers the Inquiry's role in
11 instigating the NT government to meet its review obligation, and thus the capacity of
12 bureaucracy to reproduce itself through reform.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29 *The Lease and Promise*

30
31
32
33 At Alice Springs town camps, the conditions in which property management regimes were
34 established were significantly structured by local leasing arrangements, which were subject to
35 significant reform through the Intervention. Under section 31 of the *Northern Territory*
36 *National Emergency Response Act 2007* (Cth), the Commonwealth government compulsorily
37 granted five year leases over 64 NT Aboriginal Communities. This was a radical departure
38 from the governance of land and leasing under the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern*
39 *Territory) Act 1976* (Cth) (*ALRA*) and the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth). Until the early 2000s,
40 Indigenous housing and municipal infrastructure was typically funded and often constructed
41 by governments without formal property arrangements (Terrill 2009). A shift from this
42 approach preceded the Intervention, through the cessation of the Community Housing
43 Infrastructure Program (CHIP) and Commonwealth funding of Indigenous Community
44 Housing Organizations (ICHOs), as well as via the Commonwealth government amendment
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 to the *ALRA* to allow for ‘township leasing’, whereby the land on which an Aboriginal
4 community sits is leased to the Commonwealth, which can then sublease sections of that land
5 (Terrill, 2009). This ‘secure tenure’ policy was consolidated by the Intervention in 2007,
6 under the *Memorandum of Understanding on Indigenous Housing Accommodation and*
7 *Related Services*, and in the 2008 *National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous*
8 *Housing* (NPARIH), in which parties agreed that the Commonwealth would have no further
9 responsibility for the delivery of Indigenous housing and infrastructure. Exemplifying a
10 broader trend toward welfare ‘conditionality’ at both the levels of behaviorally-proscribed
11 tenants and contractually-restrained state and territory governments (Waquant, 2009;
12 Nethercote, 2015), Commonwealth funding for Indigenous housing and infrastructure was
13 made contingent on ~~the securing of~~ access to Indigenous communities via leases. In effect,
14 this has resulted in 40-year subleases over housing precincts in remote communities and town
15 camps to the (now) NT Department of Local Government, Housing and Community
16 Development. Within such arrangements, the department assumes legal responsibility for
17 housing, including property management and tenancies.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40 The Inquiry sought to sift through the muddle that this leasing revolution generated. At Alice
41 Springs in 2009, Aboriginal Housing Associations representing 14 town camps entered into
42 tripartite Living Area Subleases with the Commonwealth authority, the Executive Director of
43 Township Leasing (EDTL), and the Chief Executive Officer of the (then) NT Department of
44 Housing. The EDTL established a Housing Management Agreement (HMA) with the NT
45 government which transfers responsibility for ‘all areas located within the town camp
46 boundary and captures all infrastructure, including housing, open spaces roads, parks and
47 community centres’ (PAC, 2016i, p. 24). By the Inquiry, this situation applied in 17 town
48 camps, with subleases established for a period of 40 years. Despite this temporal horizon, the
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Inquiry heard that the HMA had expired in 2012, subsequently operating as a periodical agreement on a month-to-month basis. EDTL annual reports noted that the HMA's month-to-month status meant capital works had not been able to progress in town camps, while the HMA stipulated that individual tenancy agreements could not extend beyond its conclusion. Thus the inability of the Commonwealth and NT governments to secure ongoing agreements meant that residents were subject to insecure tenancy arrangements in contexts where infrastructure provision was also impeded.

Tangentyere Council – an Indigenous Aboriginal-controlled incorporated association that represents Alice Springs town camp housing associations – has since its establishment in 1977 earned a widely respected reputation as a community council and resource organization. Prior to the Intervention, Tangentyere Council managed 199 houses across the town camps. Throughout protracted negotiations during the Intervention period, Aboriginal Housing Associations through Tangentyere Council resisted government pressure to sign a 99-year sublease to town camp lands in exchange for 50 million dollars funding for housing and essential infrastructure. The eventual 40-year sublease was agreed to following a commitment of 100 million dollars over five years. Lease negotiations included an eventual ultimatum put by the Commonwealth that tenancies become the responsibility of the NT government or else the Commonwealth would compulsorily acquire town camp land. Lawyers for Tangentyere Council responded that, faced with compulsory acquisition, 'The loss of tenure to these lands is something that is abhorrent to the housing associations and they could not run the risk that it might occur' (in Graham, 2009). Although town camps subsequently received new houses, refurbishments, and improvements to municipal infrastructure (PAC, 2016i), Tangentyere Council conveyed that consent given under duress does not preclude refusal (see Simpson, 2016), stating that it

1
2
3 remains of the opinion that the essential housing and services should not have come at
4 the price of leasehold. Weighing up the extreme level of need of Town Camp residents,
5 with the threat by the Commonwealth Government to compulsorily acquire the camps
6 if they did not sign, the Housing Associations negotiated the best option available at the
7 time, and agreed to sign the subleases. (Tangentyere Council, 2020)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17 The tying of housing and infrastructure funding to long-term leases forced the hand of many
18 communities into agreements like those thrust upon Tangentyere Council. Leasing under the
19 secure tenure policy required contract-making between radically unequal parties. Rental
20 revenues from Indigenous community housing are typically insufficient to cover house
21 insurance and repair and maintenance costs, underpinning a reliance on government subsidy
22 (Habibis *et al.*, 2019). The NT government is itself structurally dependent on Commonwealth
23 income via the redistribution of state and federal taxes. In this context, 40-year leases
24 represented a compromise from the original government demand for 99-year leases. But such
25 agreements were also established following Commonwealth impatience at ongoing
26 negotiations and the eventual threat of compulsory acquisition. That ~~in-process~~-negotiations
27 must conclude was disputed by Tangentyere Council's lawyers, who responded to the
28 Commonwealth that 'It is simply incorrect to assert that time has run out. The timetable is
29 completely within your power to set, as indeed you have done throughout these negotiations'
30 (in Graham, 2009). Commonwealth control of both the clock and the purse strings in
31 negotiations was indicative of a wider phenomenon across this Intervention period wherein
32 the demand for secure tenure became conditional for government housing and infrastructure
33 funding, with the absence of leases exploited by governments to justify the delay of
34 infrastructural provision. This was a convenient application of the NPARIH clause on
35 'normalised service arrangements', interpreted as concerning the standardization of leases
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 rather than of living standards. Since the Intervention it has also proved empirically untrue
4
5 that leases are required for government-funded housing: after a decade of delay, houses were
6
7 constructed at Borroloola town camps without leases in place, while only 16 of 73 remote
8
9 communities received new houses under SIHIP with the majority receiving housing
10
11 refurbishments.
12
13

14
15
16 In Alice Springs, as across the NT, the lease has operated as a demand and a promise. The
17
18 leaseholder exchanges relative political autonomy for the promise of housing and
19
20 infrastructure, and the formalization of ongoing obligations to manage and maintain those
21
22 assets. Protracted lease negotiations have themselves contributed to housing dilapidation, by
23
24 delaying the institution of legal arrangements, funding, and staffing for repair work. But this
25
26 period of negotiation is also the temporal window during which commitments to funding and
27
28 services can be extracted from governments and after which such opportunity dissipates
29
30
31 (Howey, 2020).
32
33

34
35
36 The emergency rhetoric and lawmaking underpinning the Intervention facilitated the
37
38 production of leases under new norms for conditional infrastructural provisioning: no lease,
39
40 no houses. This can be understood through Stoler's (2013, p. 8) description of imperial
41
42 formations as 'states of deferral', establishing 'gradated forms of sovereignty' and offering
43
44 promissory notes for future autonomy. However, the length of such sublease arrangements –
45
46 40 or 99 years – defers community autonomy in housing management into far-flung futures,
47
48 even as shorter-term subordinate arrangements such as HMAs expire and generate negative
49
50 implications for residents' tenancies and community infrastructure. The opening urgency of
51
52 agreement-making transitions into governmental inertia (Howey, 2020), as the long-term
53
54 temporal horizons of leases establish the continuity of unstable governance for town camps.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 For, as described above, a 40-year sublease garnered only five years of funding, with
4 subsequent investment dependent on future negotiations. With this legal framework in place,
5 the capacity (or willingness) of the NT government to fund future housing programs is
6 contingent on renewed Commonwealth funding. This was evident at the twilight of the
7 NPARIH in 2018, when protracted delays over funding arrangements between the
8 Commonwealth and NT governments were resolved, (in the form of 500 million dollars of
9 Commonwealth housing funding over five years), in the same week the NT government lifted
10 its moratorium on exploration for hydraulic fracturing. As a particular legal instrument, the
11 lease thus establishes the temporal context in which the NT government is responsible for
12 town camp property and tenancy management, ~~including that such housing meets legislated~~
13 ~~standards~~, but where the available funding for ~~achieving this~~meeting legislated obligations is
14 far from guaranteed.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33 *The Tender and Repetition*
34
35
36
37
38 The Inquiry examined the period 2010 to 2016, following the establishment of subleases for
39 Alice Springs town camps in 2009. Across this period, the department subcontracted housing
40 management services through a public tendering process, while remaining responsible for
41 contract management, procurement, and service coordination. Because this model differed
42 from the NT government's urban public housing management, the subcontracting model was
43 justified through support for local employment. In order that it could remain involved in
44 housing management on town camps and at the government request for an independent
45 Indigenous-controlled community housing provider, Tangentyere Council, in collaboration
46 with the Central Land Council and Healthabitat, established the Central Australian
47 Affordable Housing Company (CAAHC) in 2009. Thus from 2010 to 2012, CAAHC held a
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 contract to provide both property and tenancy management services. In 2012, the department
4 split housing management services into property management (including repairs and
5 maintenance) and tenancy management services, awarding separate contracts. There was no
6
7 clear ~~departmental~~ justification for this division, although Deputy CEO Mr Bamber told the
8 Inquiry that 'One of the cons [of having a single housing manager] is you do not have that
9 tension between the tenancy inspections, looking at work being done by the housing
10 maintenance contractor' (PAC, 2016ii, p. 11). Alongside these major contracts, the
11 department also employed panel contractors to perform specialized labour, relating to
12 plumbing and gas, electrical, refrigeration, carpentry, and pest control work.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

The tender process is the formal solicitation by government to procure non-government contractors for work it is unable or unwilling to do directly. This form of contractualism has been expanded through the winnowing of public sector expertise (Fisher, 1997). Clause 11 of the Alice Springs subleases established a formal requirement that the NT government 'must call for tender for the provision of housing management services in the Subleased Alice Springs Living Areas within 2 years and 6 months of the commencement of the first Alice Springs Living Areas Sublease' (PAC, 2016i, p. 25). This requirement is easily framed as neoliberal outsourcing. However, in this context it is not the dismantling of a centralized state welfare bureaucracy ~~that has been dismantled~~, but rather, a transformation from a prior form of ad hoc outsourcing to Indigenous Community Housing Organisations (ICHOs) to a competitive tender process for government service contracts in which the remaining ICHOs are forced to participate. Abstractly, the tender promises the enactment of an ideal bureaucracy – emotionless, impersonal, dehumanized (Weber, 1978). A job description is developed, standards and metrics are set, and a reporting and audit structure is established. An objective employer department then assesses prospective contractors according to their

1
2
3 competitive advantage in what department CEO Ms Clifford characterized as an 'open,
4
5 transparent and public competitive process' (PAC, 2016ii, p. 3).
6
7
8
9

10 In practice at the Alice Springs town camps, this tender model maintained decentralized
11 service provision while expanding government intervention in the minutiae of administration.
12
13 In particular, the division between property and tenancy management established complicated
14 procedures for reporting housing defects and having them repaired. During the period that
15 property and tenancy management were divided between Ingkerreke Commercial and
16 CAAHC respectively, CAAHC (2016, p. 6) narrated that a repair request would *ideally*
17 proceed as follows:
18
19

- 20 1. Tenant reports repair to CAAHC (TM Contractor)
- 21 2. CAAHC reports repairs to Housing
- 22 3. Housing issues work order to Ingkerreke (PM Contractor)
- 23 4. Ingkerreke contact tenant and complete work
- 24 5. Ingkerreke invoice Housing for work
- 25 6. Housing pay invoice.

26 This process lacked quality assurance mechanisms and produced inefficiencies, confusion
27 over responsibilities, and miscommunications (Crabtree, 2016). Specifically, once CAAHC
28 had reported a property issue to the department, it could not discern whether a job had been
29 completed and was prohibited from directly contacting Ingkerreke, (CAAHC, 2016, p. 6).
30
31

32 Conversely, Ingkerreke CEO Mr Mathison complained that requests would become
33 'bottlenecked' within the department: 'at 4 o'clock in the afternoon we may receive 20 or 30
34 orders in that 10 to 15 minute period . . . Friday afternoon, Monday morning, those sort of
35 things' (PAC, 2016iii, p. 43). In such scenarios, tenants become the *de facto* point of
36 continuity, communicating with separate tenancy and property managers and obliged to be
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 always available. CAAHC (2016, p. 4) stated of the tenancy services contract that 'The
4 arrangement was riddled with inefficiencies, double handling, red tape and processes that
5 delayed good outcomes. Where CAAHC was expected to act with relative urgency there was
6 little reciprocal urgency offered to us by NT Housing'.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15 The Inquiry describes that in only six years there ~~have been~~were three configurations of
16 contractors responsible for property and tenancy management. CAAHC held the initial
17 contract for two years, before Ingkerreke and CAAHC held contracts lasting 37 months,
18 which were superseded by 16 month contracts awarded to Tangentyere Constructions and
19 Zodiac Business Services. At the hearings, department executives struggled to explain the
20 inconsistent length of contracts (PAC, 2016ii, p. 18). The short length of contracts, and their
21 month-to-month extension, has obvious implications for service providers' staff retention and
22 development. Nonetheless, the tender process is serialized on the basis that, over a designated
23 period, a competitor may become better placed to provide a service. While a cyclical repairs
24 and maintenance regime establishes the routinized labour necessary for skills development
25 and the storage of organizational knowledge (Jacobs *et al.* 2011), this system instead
26 consolidates the bureaucratic and contractor capacities to audit reporting and re-tender for
27 work. For public servants and service providers alike, it discourages an ethnographic
28 understanding of the problems property management regimes aim to address by assessing
29 performance against measurable indicators (Lea, 2012), including the execution of
30 documentary requirements and busy work required by the contract (Gurran & Phibbs, 2016).
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

The~~is~~ repetition of tenders for housing contracts involves minor differences in contract
conditions (Deleuze, 2001) – such as their length, remuneration, assessment performance
criteria, and extension provisions – as policies are refined and funding squabbles between

1
2
3 governments occur. In determining who should be awarded a contract, cost and efficacy,
4 including cultural appropriateness, will be different weighted. Thus in 2016 Zodiac Business
5 Services tendered at less than half of the proposed costs outlined by the CAAHC and was
6 awarded the tenancies management contract. CAAHC CEO Ms Langton defended the
7 company's higher bid as the proper cost of town camp tenancy services:
8
9

10 What we tendered for in our new service model was a very holistic service that
11 included things like community engagement, support coordination, specialist debt
12 collection, getting money through the door, and a range of other things that would
13 have been pleasing for housing. (PAC, 2016ii, p. 52)

14
15 Tangentyere Council CEO Mr Shaw expressed further frustration that a for-profit 'book
16 keeping company' had been awarded work over a local, Indigenous-run Aboriginal-controlled
17 housing organization with a stake in long-term community development: 'The concern that a
18 lot of people have gotten is that they really want a generational socioeconomic framework so
19 there are social outcomes affixed to housing on the town camps' (PAC, 2016iii, p. 34).

20
21 Against the imagined vices of a monopoly service, the staccato repetition of the tender
22 process undermines any consolidation of proven processes, professional expertise, and local
23 relationships, all of which require time to accrue and are necessary to hold houses together.

24
25
26 The scheduled ends of short-term service contracts might be effectively managed by reliable
27 government oversight. But the Inquiry also described the extensive restructuring and
28 personnel turnover within the department responsible for overseeing the tender model.

29
30 Between 2012 and 2016, the department 'had four different Ministers, with the longest tenure
31 being 16 months, and it ... had a different Chief Executive for each of its three Annual
32 Reports' (PAC, 2016i, p. 66). This dynamism is highlighted further by the *Report's* 'Table 5',
33 reproduced below as Figure 1. For inexperienced Ministers, executive staff, and mobile

1
2
3 bureaucrats, a new tender process can appear as an opportunity to rectify apparent neglect
4 with new arrangements, rather than the most recent instance of repeated reinvention that is
5 neglect's cause.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 [Insert Figure 1 here]
13
14
15
16

17 *The Condition Report and Waiting* 18 19 20 21

22 The third and final legal-bureaucratic instrument that this article draws attention to is the
23 condition report, which the Inquiry also considered for its role in maintaining houses at Alice
24 Springs town camps. The housing condition report describes the state of the property via a
25 checklist of items completed by a tenancy manager. Its completion is underpinned by the
26 requirement to meet minimum standards specified in the *Residential Tenancies Act 1999*
27 (NT). While typically completed at least at the commencement and conclusion of a tenancy,
28 the tenancy services contracts at Alice Springs town camps also required quarterly property
29 inspections. Pre-tenancy in particular, the condition report is the key technology by which a
30 prospective tenant can identify housing faults and require their remediation prior to signing a
31 tenancy agreement. After that, a tenant may identify a housing fault through direct contact
32 with a tenancy manager, who would lodge a maintenance request with the department on the
33 tenant's behalf. Following a tenancy's commencement, identified housing faults are more
34 likely to be presumed related to tenant damage than housing's entropic tendency.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52
53 Empirically, the bargaining power of a prospective tenant is significantly undermined in
54 Alice Springs town camps by severe housing undersupply and extensive public housing
55 waiting lists. More than a straightforward instrument of representation (Hull, 2012), the
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 utility of the condition report for tenants depends on what housing hardware is assessed and
4 by what methods, and on the efficacy of remediation instigated by the identification of
5
6 housing failures. An Inquiry submission by CAAHC (2016) described an instance at
7
8 Larapinta Valley town camp where the department had declared pre-tenancy vacancy works
9 completed but a young mother with two children arrived at her new house to the words 'Fuck
10
11 you' graffitied across exterior walls (Figure 2). Another submission by the Central Australian
12
13 Aboriginal Legal Aid Service (CAALAS, 2016, p. 4) described a client's situation at Hoppy's
14
15 town camp where the condition report from May 2015 'recommended that, amongst other
16
17 things, the cracks in the blockwork above the entry door and the sagging ceiling lining
18
19 required rectification as a matter of priority for reasons of structural safety'. In December
20
21 2015, this tenant's ceiling collapsed onto her dining room table.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31 [Insert Figure 2 here]
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

The Inquiry described that in situations where housing faults were identified by a condition report, or through subsequent repair requests, delays in fixwork were often attributable to bureaucratic categories distinguishing breakdowns. The department used the categories 'emergency', 'immediate', 'urgent', and 'routine' to distinguish repairs, with the associated requirement that such work be attended to immediately, within four hours, two days, and ten days respectively. The department's former maintenance manual stated that

Only that type of work which is related to your health, safety or security or which affects the structure of the property will be attended to in a responsive manner. All other maintenance requests will be deferred and completed in a planned way depending on the priority and availability of funding. (PAC, 2016i, pp. 37-38).

1
2
3 Submissions Tangentyere Council (2016, p. 11) noted that once property and tenancy
4 management contracts were separated, work was rarely completed within time requirements
5 and tenants often - ‘Work was rarely carried out within the required time frames’. CAALAS
6 (2016, pp. 2-3) described that ‘Tenants often complain they have lived with the housing
7 defect for not just months, but years.’ (CAAHC, 2016, pp. 2-3).
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17 The accounts in the Inquiry showed that it takes sustained tenant vigilance to determine and
18 pursue incomplete work orders. In addition to bottlenecks for work orders, delays were also
19 attributed to a departmental perception that certain defects, such as broken doors, were
20 presumed *a priori* caused by tenant damage (rather than fair wear and tear), and thus no work
21 order was delivered to the property manager (PAC, 2016i, p. 40). Such adjudications were
22 opaque, with the property manager unaware of any items from a tenancy manager
23 maintenance request left off their work order. Ingkerreke CEO Mr Mathison suggested that
24 the department ‘had a policy I suppose, for lack of better words, where tenant damage was
25 not being responded to’ (PAC, 2016iii, p. 43). He described that
26
27

28 If somebody rang up CAAHC and reported an incident and said look there is a broken
29 door, broken tap and a broken light switch. By the time it gets to us we might have
30 gone out and fixed the broken light switch and tap, but maybe not the door because it
31 was assumed that it was deemed tenant damage. (PAC, 2016iii, p. 43)
32
33

34 Even where domestic hardware is recognized as damaged, tenants were frustrated by the
35 unwillingness of the department to generate work orders for broken air conditioners, hot
36 water services, and stoves. The former maintenance manual deemed ‘A stove with one of
37 four elements working [to be] partially operable and therefore [it] won’t be replaced’ (PAC,
38 2016i, p. 37).
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Delays in attending to housing failures are significant in accelerating related breakdowns and,
4 where a house becomes uninhabitable, breakdowns in neighbors' houses as residents shift
5 and crowding increases. In a different context, the remote community of Galiwinku, NT,
6 Inquiry submissions made by the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (NAAJA,
7 2016, p. 25) described that the department responded to a housing complaint regarding a
8 broken door by advising that a contractor would only fly to that remote community when 20
9 to 30 doors required fixing, as 'non-urgent repairs'. In the meantime, residents must live in
10 insecure properties, an issue also identified by Tangentyere Council (2016, p. 47): 'We have
11 no security at all. We have made formal complaints about the flimsy screens and the fact that
12 they can be easily cut and opened by hand'. Both the end of a lease and scheduled inspections
13 are liable to attribute such breakdowns to tenant damage. CAALAS (2016) noted that arrears
14 for public housing repairs, often alleged and recorded without proof of tenant responsibility,
15 have the effect of impeding tenants' subsequent applications for public housing, generating
16 bureaucratic disputes years later. This failure to respond to breakdowns responsively effaces
17 the contribution of domestic crowding (itself an effect of housing undersupply and delays in
18 approving tenancies) to the accelerated dilapidation of housing, which is instead interpreted
19 as tenant damage.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 In this context, the Inquiry describes how some tenants cease reporting housing failures
46 ~~altogether, letting history be their guide as to whether it is worth the effort and the wait and~~
47 ~~that-~~ wWaiting becomes a deterrent to pursue public housing altogether. The CEO of another
48 housing provider told the Inquiry that 'If you do not fix things quickly people stop reporting'
49 (PAC, 2016iii, p. 4), while Tangentyere Council CEO Mr Shaw described that 'We don't
50 have any confidence in the process or in the Territory Housing as our landlord. Our members
51 have given up ringing and reporting repairs and maintenance issues now' (Tangentyere, 2016,
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 p. 3). In seeking to have the faults specified on condition reports remedied, the property
4 management regime in Alice Springs town camps depends on a presumption that tenants
5 have unlimited time to perform the ‘sub-waits’ (Whelan, 2019, p. 9) of housing fixwork:
6 calling the department and Centrelink, pursuing legal representation, and waiting for housing
7 maintenance officers, even while new breakdowns accrue. This expectation that residents
8 wait also applies to new tenancies, following pre-tenancy inspections and the completion of
9 condition reports. CAAHC (2016, p. 8) described to the Inquiry that five tenants continued to
10 wait for their housing despite having paid their security deposits and first month’s rent three
11 months earlier. Hoag (2014, p. 411) characterizes this as ‘dereliction’, where waiting assumes
12 the form of ‘a liminal state between the policy and the practice of that policy’. While tenants
13 waited, houses stood empty, or eventually attracted the homeless into informal tenancies
14 (PAC, 2016i). In this context, condition reports are necessary to determine the inadequacies
15 of housing in relation to legislative standards. However, operationalized within the
16 governance regimes at Alice Springs town camps, they are just as likely to justify perennial
17 delays for landlord repairs and maintenance, or to constitute evidence used for claiming
18 tenant damage in the future.

45 **Beyond Bureaucracy?**

46
47
48
49 This article has described how particular legal-bureaucratic instruments employed within
50 housing management at Alice Springs town camps exacerbate housing’s entropy. These
51 instruments generate particular temporalizations: circumscribing periods of action and
52 inaction, requiring routines and repetitions, and structuring legal obligations and social
53 relations in housing governance. The lease offers the promise of government housing and
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 infrastructure provision but ~~compels demands that~~ communities ~~to~~ submit to long-term
4 regimes of perennial system change ~~that lack short-term funding guarantees~~. The tender
5 establishes the hypothetical potential for the most effective service providers to be contracted,
6 and the freedom to discontinue such arrangements, but its repetition undermines staff
7 retention, service continuity, and the development of Indigenous corporations with a stake in
8 community development. The condition report is the foremost protection for ~~public housing~~
9 ~~resident~~tenants against the provision of rental properties that are unsafe or uninhabitable, yet
10 it has functioned as a means of displacing liability for housing failures onto tenants. The
11 reliability and length of Commonwealth and NT government funding agreements bear on the
12 impact of each of these instruments – locking traditional owners into potentially unfunded
13 agreements, underpinning whether contracts for service provision are long enough to develop
14 effective systems and relationships, and determining whether there are sufficient resources to
15 respond to residents' requests for necessary fixwork.

35 Noting how such instruments disrupt and delay satisfactory housing situations for town camp
36 residents, Tangentyere Council's (2016) submissions made a case for a return to community-
37 controlled housing. This alternative governance model haunts much of the Inquiry's
38 description of state failures to maintain Indigenous housing, and how systems might be
39 reformed. PAC member MLP Wood mused that 'Historically we seem to go around in circles
40 sometimes with housing. Housing associations were quite the in thing many years ago' (PAC,
41 2016ii, p. 29). Community control is back at the forefront of policy discourse in the NT,
42 including in the department's (2020) recent housing strategy which commits to a long-term
43 transfer of housing services to Aboriginal organisations. More immediate is the demand by
44 the four land councils for the government to support a new Aboriginal-controlled housing
45 model, overseen by a new statutory body and involving regional housing organizations (CLC,
46 2020ii, p. 29).

1
2
3 2020). Research on community land trust principles for Indigenous housing (Crabtree *et al.*,
4 2016), and the Groote Archipelago Local Decision Making Agreement, offer alternative
5 models to existing government management of housing on town camps.
6
7
8
9
10
11

12 ASetting aside the important issue of who is the landlord for Indigenous housing on country
13 that First Nations people never ceded, we should note that anyny shift to community-
14 controlled housing in Alice Springs town camps is nevertheless unlikely to cease forms of
15 bureaucratic housing management, including the use of the instruments described above. In
16 its most tenant-centered application, a condition report remains the means by which housing
17 is surveyed to determine necessary repairs for increased resident health outcomes. In other
18 Australian jurisdictions, cE~~community-controlled housing providers organizations~~ regularly
19 tender for work where internal expertise is limited, ~~such as architecture, construction, IT, and~~
20 ~~environmental health.~~ Subleasing arrangements would require significant legal negotiation
21 or dispute to be set aside. Bureaucracy does not disappear with community control, though its
22 impact on the rhythms of social production could be significantly reformed. Drawing on the
23 analysis here, further work might investigate the role of tenders and condition reports in
24 proposed community housing models, including how these can be implemented in ways that
25 enable improved outcomes for tenants.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

However, the convention to conclude with speculative proposals for alternative arrangements should be curbed here, to sustain attention to path dependencies, ongoing agreements, sunk costs, and institutionalized concerns.

Such analysis is nonetheless too speculative, too typical of the academic conclusion, and too divorced from existing trajectories, sunk costs, and institutionalized concerns. Government departments do not typically relinquish control or pursue their own redundancy, except where

1
2
3 a problem is deemed especially difficult to manage, and thus attractive to outsource.
4

5 Perennial evaluation and proposal also hold things in place. Lea (2015, p. 383) notes that
6
7 'development interventions do not seek redundancy. There is no part of settler-colonial
8 governance that seeks its own disappearance.' Thus on the second day of the Inquiry's public
9
10 hearings the then-Country Liberal Party coalition government announced an independent
11 review of NT town camps. The review's due date was scheduled six months from this
12
13 announcement, two months following an upcoming election. Its remit would be broader than
14 the PAC Inquiry terms of reference, in which CLP members of parliament had chosen not to
15 participate. This review would finally satisfy the government's obligation under the town
16 camp subleases ~~and it required its own tender process~~. Awarding the tendered to a private
17 consultancy firm and subcontracted again, this work led in 2017 to the *Living on the Edge:*
18
19 *Northern Territory Town Camps Review* (DHCD, 2017), released in 2018 due to its unwieldy
20
21 16,000 pages. *Living on the Edge* is an unparalleled survey of NT infrastructure, at times
22 meticulous in its record of the poor state of town camp housing and infrastructure. Yet for
23 many Indigenous people living in houses surveyed as substandard, the review is, also, a
24 bureaucratic technique of delay. As Tangentyere Council CEO Mr Shaw put it at the Inquiry
25 hearings: 'A lot of Aboriginal people – and I am joined here by my board – are fed up and
26 have had enough of reviews... Reviews are not worth the paper they are written on, as far as
27 they are and I am concerned' (PAC, 2016iii, p. 29). Because there is no escaping bureaucracy
28 for effective Indigenous corporations working to hold governments to their promises,
29
30 Tangentyere Council had nonetheless 'been pursuing this review for years' (p. 25).
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Works Cited

1
2
3 Altman, J. (2013) Arguing the Intervention, *Journal of Indigenous Policy*, (14), pp. 1-158.
4
5 Appel, H. (2018) Infrastructural time. In Anand, N., Appel, H., & Gupta, A. (Eds) *The*
6
7 *Promise of Infrastructure*, pp. 41-60 (Durham: Duke University Press).
8
9
10 Arrigoitia, M.F. (2014) UnMaking public housing towers, *The Journal of Architecture, Design and Domestic Space*, 11(2), pp. 167-196.
11
12
13 Bear, L. (2016) Time as technique, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 45: 487-502.
14
15 Braun, B. & Whatmore, S. (2010) The stuff of politics: an introduction. In Braun, B. &
16
17 Whatmore, S. (Eds) *Political Matter, Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life*, pp. ix-
18
19 xl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
20
21
22 CAAHC (2016) *Submission to Public Accounts Committee. Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory*, 15 March (Alice Springs: Central Australian Affordable Housing Company).
23
24
25 CAALAS (2016) *Submission to the Public Accounts Committee, Legislative Assembly of the NT*, March (Alice Springs: Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service).
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Central Land Council (2020) NT land councils: Governments must commit to new community housing model. <https://www.clc.org.au/media-releases/article/nt-land-councils-governments-must-commit-to-new-community-housing-model>
COAG (2008) *National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing* (Canberra: Council of Australian Governments).
Commonwealth of Australia (2017) *Remote Housing Review: A Review of the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing and the Remote Housing Strategy (2008-2018)* (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet).
Coughlan, F. (1991) *Aboriginal Town Camps and Tangentyere Council: The Battle for Self-Determination in Alice Springs* (Bundoora: La Trobe University).

1
2
3 Crabtree, L., Moore, N., Phibbs, P., Blunden, H. & Sappideen, C. (2015) *Community Land*
4 *Trusts and Indigenous Communities: From Strategies to Outcomes. AHURI Final Report*
5
6 *No. 239 (Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute).*
7
8
9
10 Crabtree, L. (2016) *Submission to Public Accounts Committee 14 March 2016* (Sydney:
11
12 Western Sydney University).
13
14 Cross, J. (2015) The economy of anticipation: hope, infrastructure, and economic zones in
15
16 South India, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 35(3), pp.
17
18 424-437.
19
20
21 Das, V. (1997) *Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India*
22
23 (Delhi: Oxford University Press).
24
25 Deleuze, G. (2001) *Difference and Repetition* (London: Continuum).
26
27 Department of Housing and Community Development (2017) *Living on the Edge: Northern*
28
29 *Territory Town Camps Review*, May (Deloitte. Northern Territory Government).
30
31
32 Department of Local Government, Housing and Community Development (2020) *A Home*
33
34 *for All Territorians: Northern Territory Housing Strategy 2020-2025* (Darwin: Northern
35
36 Territory Government).
37
38
39 Fien, J. & Charlesworth, E. (2012) Why isn't it solved? Factors affecting improvements in
40
41 housing outcomes in remote Indigenous communities in Australia, *Habitat International*,
42
43 36, pp. 20-25.
44
45
46 Fisher, W. (1997) Doing good? The politics and antipolitics of NGO practices, *Annual*
47
48 *Review of Anthropology*, 26, pp. 439-464.
49
50
51 Goetz, E.G. (2013) *New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice and Public Housing Policy*
52
53 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
54
55
56 Graham, C. (2009) Macklin's town camp takeover derailed by big guns, *Crikey*, 31 July.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Graham, S. & Thrift, N. (2007) Out of order: understanding repair and maintenance, *Theory,*
4
5 *Culture & Society*, 24(3), pp. 1-25.

6
7 Grealy, L. & Lea, T. (2020). Housing waste. In Allon, F. Barcan, R. & Eddison-Cogan, K.
8
9 (Eds) *The Temporalities of Waste*, pp. in press 75-86 (London: Routledge).

10
11
12 Gurran, N. & Phibbs, P. (2015) Are governments really interested in fixing the housing
13
14 problem? Policy capture and busy work in Australia. *Housing Studies*, 30(5): 711-729.

15
16
17 Habibis, D., Phillips, R., Spinney, A., Phibbs, P., & Churchill, B. (2016) *Reviewing Changes*
18
19 to Housing Management on Remote Indigenous Communities. AHURI Final Report
20
21 No.271 (Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute).

22
23
24 Habibis D., Phillips, R., & Phibbs, P. (2019) Housing policy in remote Indigenous
25
26 communities: how politics obstructs good policy, *Housing Studies*, 34(2), pp. 252-271

27
28
29 Haraway, D. (2016) *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham:
30
31 Duke University Press).

32
33 Hoag, C. (2014) Dereliction at the South African Department of Home Affairs: time for the
34
35 anthropology of bureaucracy, *Critique of Anthropology*, 34(4), pp. 410-428.

36
37
38 Howey, K. (2014) 'Normalising' what? A qualitative analysis of Aboriginal land tenure
39
40 reform in the Northern Territory, *Australian Indigenous Law Review*, 18(1), pp. 4-23.

41
42 Howey, K. (2020) The Ranger Uranium Mine agreement revisited: spacetimes of Indigenous
43
44 agreement-making in Australia, *Transformations*, (33), pp. 96-115.

45
46 Hull, M. (2012) Documents and bureaucracy, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 41, pp. 251-
47
48 267.

49
50
51 Jacobs, J. & Cairns, S. (2011) Ecologies of dwelling: Maintaining high-rise housing in
52
53
54 Singapore. In Bridge, G. & Watson, S. (Eds) *The New Blackwell Companion to the City*,
55
56 pp. 79-95 (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.).

57
58 Kafka, B. (2009) Paperwork: the state of the discipline, *Book History*, 12, pp. 340-353.
59
60

1
2
3 Lea, T. (2012) When looking for anarchy, look to the state: Fantasies of regulation in forcing
4 disorder within the Australian Indigenous estate. *Critique of Anthropology*, 32(2): 109-
5 124.

6
7
8
9
10 Lea, T. (2015) What has water got to do with it? Indigenous public housing and Australian
11 settler colonial relations, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 5(4), pp. 375-386.

12
13
14
15 Lea, T. (2020) *Indigeneity and the Unruly Logics of Intervention* (Stanford: Stanford
16 University Press).

17
18
19 Lea, T. (2021) Staying with the state: Prefiguring capacities for change within Indigenous
20 social policy. In Strakosch, E., Lahn, J. & Sullivan, P (Eds) *Bureaucratic Occupation:*
21 *Government and First Nations Peoples in Australia* (London: Routledge)

22
23
24
25 Lerner, S. (2012) *Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United*
26 *States* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

27
28
29 Murphy, M. (2006) *Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty* (Durham: Duke
30 University Press).

31
32
33 NAAJA (2016) *Northern Territory Housing Issues Paper and Response to the Housing*
34 *Strategy Consultation Draft*, February (Darwin: North Australian Aboriginal Justice
35 Agency).

36
37
38 Nethercote, M. (2015) Operationalizing a responsibility agenda in Australia's Indigenous
39 communities: confused, doubtful and subversive public housing tenants, *Housing, Theory*
40 *and Society*, 32(2), pp. 171-195.

41
42
43 Nixon, R. (2011) *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Cambridge: Harvard
44 University Press).

45
46
47 Public Accounts Committee (2016i) *Report on Repairs and Maintenance of Housing on*
48 *Town Camps*, May (Darwin: Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory).

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Public Accounts Committee (2016ii) *Public Hearing Transcript into Housing Repairs and*
4
5 *Maintenance on Town Camps*, 2 March (Darwin: Legislative Assembly of the Northern
6
7 Territory).
8
9

10 Public Accounts Committee (2016iii) *Inquiry into Housing Repairs and Maintenance on*
11
12 *Town Camps Public Hearing Transcript*, 11 April (Darwin: Legislative Assembly of the
13
14 Northern Territory).
15
16

17 Pholeros, P. & Phibbs, P. (2012) Constructing and maintaining houses. Research sheet No.
18
19 13. Closing the Gap Clearing House (Canberra: Australian Government).
20
21

22 Pholeros, P., Rainow, S., & Torzillo, P. (1993) *Housing for Health: Towards a Healthy*
23
24 *Living Environment for Aboriginal People* (Newport: Healthabitat).
25
26

27 Povinelli, E. (2011) *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late*
28
29 *Liberalism* (Durham: Duke University Press).
30
31

32 Seicshnaydre, S. (2016) Missed opportunity: furthering fair housing in the Housing Choice
33
34 Voucher Program, *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 79, pp. 173-197.
35
36

37 Shapiro, N. (2015) Attuning to the chemosphere: domestic formaldehyde, bodily reasoning,
38
39 and the chemical sublime, *Cultural Anthropology*, 30(3), pp. 368-393.
40
41

42 Simpson, A. (2016) Consent's revenge, *Cultural Anthropology*, 31(3), pp. 326-333.
43
44

45 Stoler, A. (2013) 'The rot remains': From ruins to ruination. In Stoler, A. (Ed.) *Imperial*
46
47 *Debris: On Ruins and Ruination*, pp. 1-35 (Durham: Duke University Press).
48
49

50 Tangentyere Council (2016) *Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory Public Accounts*
51
52 *Committee Inquiry into Housing Repairs and Maintenance on Town Camps*, 15 March
53
54 (Alice Springs: Tangentyere Council Aboriginal Corporation).
55
56

57 Tangentyere Council (2020). About Tangentyere Council. Accessed on 2 July at
58
59 <https://www.tangentyere.org.au/about/>
60

61 Terrill, L. (2009) The days of the failed collective, *UNSW Law Journal*, 32(3), pp. 814-851.
62
63

1
2
3 Valverde, M. (2015). *Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance* (Abingdon &
4
5 New York: Routledge).

6
7
8 Vigh, H. (2008). Crisis and chronicity: anthropological perspectives on continuous conflict
9
10 and decline, *Ethnos*, 73(1), pp. 5-24.

11
12 Vivian, A. (2010). Some human rights are worth more than others: The Northern Territory
13
14 Intervention and the Alice Springs town camps, *Alternative Law Journal*, 35(1), pp. 13-
15
16 17.

18
19 ~~Wacquant, L. (2009) *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*~~
20
21 ~~(Durham: Duke University Press).~~

22
23 Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

24
25 Whelan, A. (2019) 'Ask for more time': big data chronopolitics in the Australian welfare
26
27 bureaucracy, *Critical Sociology*, n.p.

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7 **Table 4: Length of tenure of the Department of Housing's Executive Team as**
8 **identified within Annual Reports¹⁸⁸**

Housing	Years CEO	No of Exec	1 year	2 years	3+ years
2015	0 Clifford	10	2	0	0
2014	0 Bradford	10	2	1	1
2013	0 McGill	12	5	3	1
DHLGRS					
2012	2 Davies	22	9	8	?
2011	1 Davies	17	13	?	?

23 Figure 1. Dynamic oversight, reproduced from PAC (2016i, p. 67).
24

25 122x63mm (144 x 144 DPI)
26



Figure 2. Declared ready for tenants, reproduced from CAAHC (2016, p. 8)

106x63mm (144 x 144 DPI)